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This thesis examines contemporary U.S. immigration for humanitarian 
populations from Honduras, Cuba, and Syria. Humanitarian immigration refers to 
refugees, asylum seekers, and those who are forcibly displaced from their homelands. 
The study explores how the United States can balance its identity as a nation of 
immigrants with its increasing security concerns within forced migrant populations. The 
research describes various philosophies of and motives for migration and the United 
States’ role as an international destination for refugees. The study also provides a 
comprehensive review of all U.S. humanitarian immigration programs available to forced 
migrants from Honduras, Cuba, and Syria. These unique reviews, or case studies, are 
introduced with descriptions of each country’s social, political, and historical context for 
migration and feature fictional scenarios in which immigrant families interact directly 
with country conditions and the U.S. humanitarian immigration programs available to 
them. Finally, the thesis reviews national security concerns presented by humanitarian 
immigration programs and explains how national priorities and legislative remedies can 
temper public fear.  
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Immigration has always been a major component of the United States’ national 
strategy. Humanitarian immigration refers to programs specifically designed to assist 
refugees, asylum seekers and other populations of forced migrants. The United States has 
historically taken pride in the values represented by its humanitarian immigration 
programs. However, the programs that address humanitarian immigrants have been under 
increased public scrutiny as a potential source of security concerns. Immigration law 
ensures that those who support terrorism, commit violent crimes and/or otherwise 
threaten the peace and order of the United States are not eligible for lawful entry. This 
study seeks to determine how the nation can maintain a national identity that supports 
humanitarian immigration while simultaneously safeguarding itself from those who seek 
to do harm.   
The research initially describes different philosophies behind mass migration and 
why the United States is a desired international destination for immigrants. There is an 
overview of current U.S. humanitarian immigration programs in use for three specific 
countries: Honduras, Cuba and Syria. Some programs are unique to specific countries of 
origin, while other programs are available to all foreign nationals. Each case study begins 
with a description of the country’s social, political and historical context and the reasons 
that their displaced populations are compelled to leave. Information describing pertinent 
U.S. humanitarian immigration programs is presented using fictional scenarios that 
feature immigrant families who interact with the existing country conditions and 
immigration programs available to them. Following the three case studies, there is a 
detailed explanation of the background check and screening process used in the U.S. 
Refugee Program. The discussion compares the legal immigration process with processes 
used by those who enter the country with minimal or delayed government screening and 
those who enter the country with no government screening. Finally, there is a review of 
threats posed by modern terrorist groups, such as ISIS, and the role that the U.S. 
humanitarian immigration system plays in screening potential terrorists. 
 xvi 
The resulting recommendations provide several potential legislative solutions that 
ensure the immediate safeguarding of the U.S. pro-immigration national strategy: 
(1) Expand the U.S. refugee definition. 
Include those who require refuge under a long-term Temporary Protected Status 
due to urgent environmental catastrophes and/or general violence.   
(2) Keep Temporary Protected Status temporary. 
Ensure that the Temporary Protected Status category is not used to address 
displaced persons for more than five years. Temporary Protected Status is not a long-term 
solution. 
(3) Improve local access to humanitarian immigration programs for families 
in Central America. 
Central American families are most often forced to pursue U.S. humanitarian 
immigration programs by applying at the southern land border of the United States. In 
order to arrive at this physical destination, these displaced populations must use unlawful 
and treacherous human smuggling networks to cross through Mexico into the United 
States. 
(4) Discontinue immigration programs that promote Cuban exceptionalism. 
Cuban refugees’ needs can be considered within the existing humanitarian 
immigration structures. As the United States seeks to mend its diplomatic relationship 
with Cuba, Cuban nationals must be held to the same international standards as all other 
potential immigrants coming into the United States.  
(5) Enhance immigration enforcement for those in violation of U.S. 
immigration laws. 
The greatest migratory threat to national security is those who circumvent or 
commit fraud against the existing immigration laws and processes. The total number of 
people deported from the country in 2015 (235,413) is the lowest number deported in 
 xvii 
over eight years due to decreased immigration enforcement priorities.1 Immigration 
courts and enforcement officers should receive adequate resources and directives to 
ensure the expeditious handling of those who stand in violation of the law. 
(6) Establish greater control over the U.S. Asylum Program. 
The U.S. Asylum Program lacks the same control featured throughout the U.S. 
Refugee Program. Those who request asylum in the United States can enter the country 
legally or illegally and are often forced to wait in a “limbo” immigration status, 
sometimes for years, during the asylum hearing process.  
This research represents a comprehensive review of the current U.S. humanitarian 
immigration system in place for three countries with large displaced populations and 
significant security risk. The 2014 Department of Homeland Security Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review states, “At the center of any good immigration system must 
be an administrative structure able to rapidly respond to changes in demand while 
safeguarding security.”2 The implementation of the recommended procedures would help 
to create a dynamic immigration system able to address global humanitarian migratory 
needs in a way that promotes the pro-immigration ideals and the safety of the country. 
 
 
                                                 
1 “FY 2015 ICE Immigration Removals,” Immigration and Customs Enforcement, accessed January 6, 
2016, https://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 70. 
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Humanitarian immigration describes the system within the federal government 
that is designed to assist international populations with the greatest migratory need: 
forced migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. It is a cornerstone of the American 
identity, as the poet Emma Lazarus captured in her famous verse now engraved on the 
Statue of Liberty: 
Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!1 
 
The United States takes tremendous pride in the values represented by its humanitarian 
immigration programs. Although these programs follow specific U.S. laws to determine 
which applicants qualify, the laws have been interpreted over the years to become an “ad-
hoc” list of country-specific programs, rules, and exceptions. Humanitarian immigration 
programs must adequately address the vulnerabilities of international displaced refugees 
in a way that protects the security of the United States.  
This research explores the complexity of U.S. humanitarian immigration policy 
through the direct lens of the affected populations in Honduras, Cuba, and Syria. Three 
composite fictional scenarios featuring immigrants from these areas have been created 
based on the forced migrants’ collective human experience as derived from news stories, 
academic research, and legal cases. The goal is to provide recommendations for 
improving humanitarian immigration programs in the United States based on a study of 
the users interacting with the system.  
When one considers human systems, such as a justice system or an immigration 
system, one must take into account that these are relatively recent societal systems. 
Human interaction does not exist without some degree of empathy. According to 
                                                 
1 Emma Lazarus, “The New Colossus,” lines 10–14. 
 2 
professor and author Ken Binmore, empathy is a necessary ingredient to establish social 
contracts through the evolution of fairness; “Without the ability to empathize, we 
wouldn’t be able to operate decentralized social contracts that rely on our coordinating on 
an equilibrium without subordinating ourselves to the direction of a dominant 
individual.”2 Empathy as a basic human emotion should be highlighted as a way to help 
the public understand the role of immigration law and the motives of immigrants beyond 
information offered in news reports, statistics, political debates and immigration policies. 
Empathy is not about “feeling sorry” for another person. Empathy is about attempting to 
engage in a social contract. To understand this relationship is to understand the mindset 
of a fellow human being by attempting to see the world through his or her eyes, using his 
or her logic. Introducing empathy into the U.S. humanitarian immigration system can 
help the American public and policymakers develop appropriate initiatives that balance 
international humanitarian need with growing security concerns.     
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can increased understanding of humanitarian immigration 
populations improve U.S. immigration programs and protect the United 
States from terrorist and/or criminal threats within those same 
populations? 
This research explores applicable U.S. humanitarian immigration programs 
available to forced migrants in Honduras, Cuba and Syria, including (but not limited to) 
the refugee and asylum programs. The research is guided by three case studies that 
feature fictional scenarios to show families of immigrants from each country interacting 
directly with local conditions that influence their decisions to migrate and the U.S. 
immigration programs available to them.       
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An extensive analysis of existing literature was conducted to prepare for the 
research and methodology used in this study. The literature review first covers different 
philosophies behind immigration, the sociological and economic considerations of 
                                                 
2 Ken Binmore, Natural Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 115.  
 3 
migration, the role of sending nations, the unique needs of humanitarian migrants, and the 
lure of the United States as a destination for immigrants. The literature review then turns 
to support the narrative methodology used in this study. Narratives are powerful tools 
able to convey complex information. There exists substantial research in education and 
human development studies to suggest that narratives are natural learning tools. The three 
countries’ background research and humanitarian immigration programs are then 
introduced through the narrative case studies.       
1. Philosophy of Migration 
Immigration theories traverse a wide philosophical spectrum. The major debate 
concerns the inherent conflict among liberal ideals, democratic principles, and the role of 
government. The liberal idea of “equality for all” is a founding principle for modern 
democracies that springs from social contract theory dating back to John Locke and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau.3 This idea becomes complicated when states create borders and 
requirements for citizenship. Pure liberal ideals provide the framework for open border 
theorists. Authors such as Philip Cole and Javier Hidalgo state that border controls are 
inherently contrary to the idea of “freedom for all.”4 Arash Abizadeh, however, believes 
that border controls are justified by the democratic principle of self-determination. But 
Abizadeh also argues that democracy requires popular sovereignty to ensure that 
decisions are made by a consensus of the affected population(s). Because a state’s 
members and non-members are both subjected to border controls, democratic principles 
suggest that both parties should have a say in border policy decisions.5 U.S. immigration 
policy is enacted through legislation approved by a representative of Congress, who is 
elected by U.S. citizen voters. Immigration policy decisions in the United States consider 
                                                 
3 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: With a Supplement, Patriarcha, by Robert Filmer (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1947). 
4 Philip Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000); Javier S. Hidalgo, “Freedom, Immigration, and Adequate 
Options,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2012): 1–23. 
5 A. Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to Unilaterally Control Your Own 
Borders,” Political Theory 36 (2008): 36–65, http://www.cridaq.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/Abizadeh_-
_Democratic_theory.pdf. 
 4 
neither the opinions of the sending countries (on the other side of the international 
border) nor those of the migrants potentially affected by the immigration policies.  
Michael Blake is a scholar who takes a slightly different view—one that also is 
more in line with the immigration policy actions taken by U.S. lawmakers. Blake argues 
that each nation has the limited right to exclude some immigrants because a society does 
not have to accept undue responsibility or obligation for others.6 The United States 
routinely excludes immigrants based on laws that stipulate when the United States will 
take on new obligations to a foreign national. Alternately, the concept of non-domination 
is introduced by philosophy scholar Marit Hovdal-Moan. The non-domination theory 
suggests that non-resident immigrants have some rights conveyed upon entry into the 
country and that individual rights and inclusion in the democracy should gradually 
increase over time to avoid social dominance by certain sectors of society.7 The United 
States does convey a limited degree of rights to every individual who enters the country. 
The process for increasing a non-resident immigrant’s rights in the United States to avoid 
social dominance varies with the type of visa, employment opportunities, country of 
nationality and programs available to the particular immigrant, as is demonstrated 
throughout this research. 
Other scholars expand on the philosophical ideals of a country’s moral 
responsibility to its immigrant populations. Crispino E.G. Akakpo and Patti T. Lenard 
suggest that trying to superimpose any sweeping moral and philosophical theories 
excludes “non-standard” reasons for immigration and that the very decision to immigrate 
is not a single, fixed decision but rather something that grows and changes over time.8 
Demographer Michael S. Teitelbaum wrote several essays about our ability to understand 
and possibly predict human international migration through academic theories or 
                                                 
6 Michael Blake, “The Right to Exclude,” Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy 17, no. 5 (2014): 521–537.  
7 Marit Hovdal-Moan, “Unequal Residence Statuses and the Ideal of Non-Domination,” Critical 
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2013): 1–20. 
8 Crispino E.G. Akakpo and Patti T. Lenard, “New Challenges in Immigration Theory: An 
Overview,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17, no. 5 (2014): 493–502. 
 5 
frameworks.9 Teitelbaum determined that such categorization often depends more on the 
social perspective of the person making the assessment and less on the actual issue of 
migration. According to Teitelbaum, North Americans tend to see migration from a 
“push-pull” framework, in which migrants are simultaneously pushed by undesirable 
factors in their home countries and pulled by better prospects in the receiving country, the 
United States. Michael Teitelbaum asserts that academic theories can contribute to a 
basic understanding of certain factors of human migration patterns but that such theories 
will always be inadequate because of the tremendous impact and role of states. The 
scholarship of Aristide Zolberg also suggests that human migration is the product of 
multiple factors and government policies, and migration cannot be reduced to any one 
simple formula or theory.10  
Dr. Douglas Massey and Dr. Jorge Durand Arp-Nisen have launched an ongoing 
sociology study through Princeton University that focuses on the human motivations for 
immigration in Latin America. The project is called the “Latin American Migration 
Project,” and collects qualitative and quantitative data through a process known as 
ethnosurveys.11 Ethnosurveys are intended to provide concise data through a unique 
structure that allows for cultural flexibility.12 The goal of the study is to provide a 
comprehensive picture of human migration in Latin America that takes sociological 
differences into account.    
Most scholars agree that any simplified explanation for human migration lacks the 
detail that must exist in any system that explores human behavior. In fact, Professor 
Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez suggests that an over-simplified or linear approach to the complex 
                                                 
9 Michael S. Teitelbaum, Migration and United States—Latin American Relations in the 1980s 
(working paper) (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1984). 
10 Aristide Zolberg, “Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy,” in The Handbook for 
International Migration: The American Experience, eds. Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Joseph 
DeWind (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 71. 
11 Jorge Duran Arp-Nisen and Douglas Massey, “Latin American Migration Project,” Princeton 
University Office of Population Research, accessed October 30, 2015, http://lamp.opr.princeton.edu/home-
en.htm. 
12 Duran Arp-Nisen and Massey, “Latin American Migration Project.” 
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problem of immigration is, in fact, creating the problem.13 Simplified migrational studies 
may focus on statistics and research that feature the destination of immigrants but that 
lacks data and perspectives from the point of departure. Cris Beauchemin’s research 
suggests new multi-sided approaches that incorporate trans-national data must be 
employed when looking at human movement.14 Joseph Wiltberger also reminds readers 
that the countries of departure should be regularly involved in developing immigration 
policies, as they are an integral component of any migrant’s decision to relocate.15  
One academic study performed by Jonathan Hiskey, Jorge Montalvo, and Diana 
Orcés suggests that there is a strong relationship between democracy and emigration 
(departure from the country). The study analyzed 22 different countries in Latin America 
and found the nations with stronger democracies that adequately provide basic 
governance for its citizens had a smaller portion of its population seeking to immigrate to 
the United States.16 Another team of researchers—Uma A. Segal, Nazneen S. Mayadas, 
and Doreen Elliott—sought to develop a framework that could transcend cultures to 
explain a person’s entire immigration process and the factors that influence each step of a 
migrant’s decision: departure from his homeland, making the journey, selecting a 
receiving country, and acceptance by the host nation.17 Academic theorist Amy 
Cappiccie developed a model for studying the factors that lead to the development of 
immigration policies.18 The model takes multiple immigration theories into consideration 
and is intended to be used cross-culturally to include individual, as well as group and 
societal factors. Cappiccie explains that immigration policy is profoundly shaped by the 
                                                 
13 Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, Ctrl+Alt+Delete: Rebooting Immigration Policies through Socio-technical 
Change (working paper) (Houston, TX: Rice University April 2013). 
14 Cris Beauchemin, “A Manifesto for Quantitative Multi-Sited Approaches to International 
Migration,” International Migration Review (Winter 2014): 921–938. 
15 Joseph Wiltberger, “Bringing Latin America into U.S. Debates on Latino Immigration: Views from 
El Salvador,” Development 52, no. 4 (2009): 519–524. 
16 Jonathan Hiskey, Jorge Montalvo, and Diana Orcés, “Democracy, Governance, and Emigration 
Intentions in Latin America and the Caribbean,” Studies in Comparative International Development 49, no. 
1 (March 2014): 89–111. 
17 Uma A. Segal, Nazneen S. Mayadas, and Doreen Elliott, “A Framework for Immigration,” Journal 
of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 4, no. 1 (March 2006): 3–24. 
18 Amy C. Cappiccie, “A New Model for Studying Immigration Policy,” Journal of Immigrant and 
Refugee Studies 9, no. 4 (October 2011): 434–451. 
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elements described in major immigration theories, but policy also includes a range of 
influencing factors beyond the theories, such as the nation’s view of its own citizenship 
and the occurrence of major international events.19  
The International Union for the Scientific Study of Population Problems (now the 
International Union for the Scientific Study of Population [IUSSP]) is a scholarly 
organization that began in 1928 to “promote international scientific co-operation to study 
the various aspect of population problems, through national committees and through its 
members themselves.”20 The IUSSP continues to study matters of demography and 
human movement in order to identify root causes, trends and theories behind why people 
move from one place to another.21 These factors are called, “the determinants of 
migration.”22 The research from this study suggests that the most comprehensive review 
of migratory “determinants” comes from looking at multiple perspectives, particularly the 
perspective of the immigrant that varies according to gender (see Table 1). 
Table 1.   Motivations for Latin American Migration to the United States 
by Gender 
Variable (motivation for migration) Females Males Total 
Economic conditions at origin 17.0% 22.5% 20.3% 
Opportunities at destination 17.0% 22.5% 20.3% 
Network links 3.8 18.8 12.8 
Violence at origin 5.7 1.3 3.0 
Family reasons 24.5 20.0 21.8 
Other 32.1 15.0 21.8 
Adapted from Douglas Massey and Magaly Sanchez-R, Brokered Boundaries: Creating 
Immigrant Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times (New York: Russell Sage, 2010), 
http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/iip/. 
                                                 
19 Cappiccie, “A New Model.” 
20 Douglas S. Massey et al., Worlds in Motion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), intro. 
21 Massey et al., Worlds in Motion, vii. 
22 Ibid., 3. 
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Philosophical and sociological research supports the idea that an immigrant’s 
decision to move is the product of multiple factors relating to the individual, his or her 
social group, and his or her role within a particular society. But any explanation for why a 
person chooses to move must take basic economics into account. Negative assumptions 
about immigrants, the economy, and job markets are often seen in host nations’ anti-
immigration rhetoric, particularly among populations with high levels of unskilled labor. 
D. Champlin, a scholar of economics, explores the argument that excess low-skilled 
immigrants drive wages down and increase demand for public services.23 Champlin 
details how labor markets work and suggests that enacting effective immigration policy 
for low-skilled immigrants would not negatively harm the labor market but rather 
improve the labor market for all. Author Max Castro makes a strong case that free 
markets are enhanced by open borders and today’s world of interconnectedness and 
changing nation-states does not necessarily make a case for stronger border security.24 
Scholarship relating to economics and migration demonstrates that free markets can be 
hindered by heavy restrictions on human movement.   
Modern human migration to the United States has been categorized into four 
phases that verify the strong historical relationship between immigration and economics. 
The first phase occurred before industrialization, from 1500 to 1800, when large 
plantations required cheap labor to keep businesses profitable. Humans (both European 
and African) moved from highly populated areas to the more sparsely populated “new 
world.”25 The industrial period categorized the second phase, from 1800 to 1925, when 
millions of people moved from Europe to the Americas for work and opportunity.26 This 
phase terminated abruptly at the beginning of World War I, when the United States began 
to restrict the number of immigrants allowed to enter the country.27 In the 1960s, world 
                                                 
23 D. Champlin, “Institutionalist Perspectives on Immigration Policy: An Update,” Journal of 
Economic Issues 44, no. 2 (2010): 301–312. 
24 Max Castro (ed.), Free Markets, Open Societies, Closed Borders?: Trends in International 
Migration and Immigration Policy in the Americas (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1999). 
25 Castro, Free Markets, Open Societies. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Douglas S. Massey, “The New Immigration and the Meaning of Ethnicity in the United States,” 
Population and Development Review 14 (1995): 383–414. 
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migration shifted again from the movement of predominantly European migrants to those 
from Africa, Asia, and the Americas. There are also more countries receiving immigrants 
today than in the past.28  
The United States still operates within a restrictive immigration system, but laws 
and policies have changed over the years as a result of different acts of legislation. The 
migratory reality of today is complex, and the basic “push-pull” economic theory that has 
historically explained human migration no longer makes sense. As Douglas S. Massey 
and his co-authors explain: 
The theoretical approach to immigration that has prevailed for the past 
fifty years does not adequately come to terms with the complexities of the 
current reality, and social scientists have consequently begun to question 
the two pillars upon which earlier models were built. At the micro-level, 
they question the conceptualization of migrants as rational actors 
responding to economic disparities between countries. At the macro-level, 
they question the “push-pull” approach, which views migration as a means 
of establishing equilibrium between region of labour supply and demand. 
With seeds of doubt planted about the primacy of economic motives, the 
conceptual edifice of neoclassical economics has begun to wobble as 
never before.29   
Economics plays a pivotal role in human migration trends, but modern 
scholarship agrees that it is not the only driving factor. When looking at migration 
patterns, the sending nation must provide adequate security and economic opportunities 
for its citizens. An immigrant’s country of origin and cultural context play a pivotal role 
in human movement decisions. Sending nations bear a large responsibility for 
discouraging permanent departures. A successful border security or immigration policy 
should examine the entire trajectory of an immigrant’s decision to relocate: the root 
causes that exist in sending nations as well as the consequences and security of the 
receiving nation.  
                                                 
28 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in 
the Modern World (New York: Guilford Press, 1993). 
29 Massey et al., Worlds in Motion, 8. 
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2. Refugees, Asylum seekers, and Displaced Persons 
Asylum seekers and refugees constitute an important force in immigration 
patterns. Forced migration is different from economic migration. Forced migration is a 
human reaction triggered by motives of basic survival. It transcends cultures, languages, 
and locations. The term “forced migration” implies that the migrant has no viable way to 
remain safely in any part of his or her country of origin. Because of this urgency, 
humanitarian migrants can quickly overwhelm existing legal immigration systems and 
cause serious concern for the security of the receiving nations.  
The United States can guard against and/or discourage unlawful entries, but the 
United States is not likely to implement a strategy to prohibit immigrants from entering 
the country.30 Such a policy would be contrary to the nation’s identity. No matter what 
legal immigration structure exists, people will migrate to the United States. Humanitarian 
migrants seek safety and opportunity with a sense of urgency. Congress created the U.S. 
Refugee Program as a formal response to counter the international need for resettlement 
of displaced persons following the persecution and destruction of Europe in World 
War II.31 The legal definition of a refugee determines who qualifies for resettlement in 
the United States. The definition covers those who fear persecution based on certain 
immutable characteristics. Many who escape their countries of origin and apply for 
humanitarian consideration in the United States do not qualify as refugees under the 
current definition.  
Forced migration fundamentally differs from general immigration and economic 
migratory trends. A formal understanding of forced migration was announced during the 
1951 United Nations (UN) Geneva Convention.32 At this time, the United Nations 
Commission of Human Rights was made up of eighteen UN member nations, and the 
drafting committee of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights consisted of nine 
                                                 
30 Massey et al., Worlds in Motion, 290–291. 
31 “History of the U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program,” Refugee Council USA, accessed February 15, 
2015, http://www.rcusa.org/index.php?page=history. 
32 “The 1951 Refugee Convention,” United Nations, UNHCR, accessed January 15, 2015, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html. 
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nation members.33 Though most nations (particularly those in Africa, Asia, Central 
America, and South America) were absent from the deliberations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights remains the founding document for international refugee 
laws and programs. It articulates many rights, including the right to education, the right to 
work, the right to security, and the right to a healthy standard of living for all people.34 
When basic human rights are denied, forced migration often ensues.  
It is tempting for nations to classify the asylum-seeking migrant alongside 
economic migrants, who are seeking benefits to which they are not necessarily entitled. 
The distinction between economic and forced migration is incredibly important to 
immigration policy; as scholar William J. Durch explains: “Under international law, 
states have no duties or obligations to economic migrants, while refugees, ‘have the right 
to apply for asylum and to demonstrate the political nature of their plight.”35 Economic 
migrants can be refused, but asylum seekers have the right to seek a safe haven. That was 
the major underlying principle within the Geneva Convention and the modern 
implementation of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees.36 When a 
person requests asylum in the United States and has a valid claim, the country cannot 
deny the request. 
The U.S. definition of a refugee comes directly from the ideas presented by the 
UN and is housed in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952: 
The term “refugee” means any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is 
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who 
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution 
                                                 
33 “History of the Document,” UNHCR, accessed February 15, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml. 
34 “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Full Text,” United Nations, accessed February 15, 
2015, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
35 William J. Durch, “Keepers of the Gates: National Militaries in an Age of International Population 
Movement,” in Demography and National Security, ed. Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2001), Chapter 4. 
36 “History of the Document,” UNHCR. 
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or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.37   
Refugee status is granted in the United States only when a person has been or may be 
persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion. It is important to note that, under the U.S. definition, a person cannot 
be a refugee from an environmental catastrophe or from general violence that ensues in a 
region due to a war or a government that is unable to enforce law and order. A refugee 
must be able to relate the violence or persecution back to an immutable political or social 
characteristic: a political party, an ethnicity, or tribe. Author Jennifer Hyndman disagrees 
with this need for distinction, suggesting that all refugee affairs are inherently political; 
“Nation-states, borders, and refugees,” she explains, “belong to a discourse of 
conventional geopolitics. Refugees, in the modern sense, are a creation of international 
law in this century.”38 Each nation is allowed to determine its own definition of a 
refugee, though many have looked to the foundation laid by the UN to help establish that 
definition.  
Numerous factors working simultaneously may compel a person to seek refuge 
through migration. Scholar Jacques Vernant explored this issue in 1953 when he 
published his book, The Refugee in the Post-War World. In this book, Vernant argued 
that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish when human movement is politically or 
economically motivated due to a complex and overlapping relationship between the 
two.39 Aristide Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Aguayo argue that the two major 
dichotomies used by most Western nations to distinguish refugees from other immigrants 
are insufficient—the idea that refugees move involuntarily, as opposed to voluntarily, and 
that they move because of political forces, as opposed to economic forces.40 Zolberg, 
Suhrke, and Aguayo explain that a refugee is defined (by the United States and other UN 
                                                 
37 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C., § 1101 (1952).    
38 Jennifer Hyndman, Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of 
Humanitarianism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), xvi. 
39 Jacques Vernant, The Refugee in the Post-War World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1953), 5. 
40 Vernant, The Refugee, 30–31. 
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member nations) as one of two types, “(as) an activist, engaging in some politically 
significant activity that the state seeks to extinguish; and ... as a target, by misfortune of 
belonging–often by accident of birth—to a social or cultural group that has been singled 
out for the abuse of state power.”  
But the authors argue a third category has emerged since the UN definitions were 
established—”the refugee as a mere victim.”41 Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo agree that 
the legal definition of a refugee should not hinge upon the relationship between the 
refugee and the political motives of the violence from which the refugee flees.42 Zolberg, 
Suhrke, and Aguayo suggest that a refugee can be any person who is victimized when he 
or she is unable to remain in his or her home country due to an ongoing elevated level of 
violence and local authorities’ inability to provide a working system of law and order. 
The legal definition of a refugee used in the United States is found in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act. The U.S. definition rejects the idea of generalized victimization due 
to elevated violence in a region. The Immigration and Nationality Act requires a refugee 
to tie acts of violence in his or her home country specifically to his or her race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.43  
The definition of forced migration was expanded by the 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration. The declaration was written with the assistance of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to address regional refugee issues in Central and 
South America. The Cartagena Declaration uses a broader definition of a refugee, to 
include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have 
been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive 
violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order.”44 The Cartagena Declaration is not a binding agreement, but it has been used as 
                                                 
41 Sergio Aguayo, Astri Suhrke, and Aristide R. Zolberg, Escape from Violence: Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 30. 
42 Aguayo, Suhrke, and Zolberg, Escape from Violence, 33. 
43 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952). 
44 “The Cartagena Declaration,” presented at the Colloquium on International Protection of Refugees 
in Central America, Mexico and Panama: Juridical and Humanitarian Problems (Cartagena, Colombia, 
1984), accessed May 10, 2015, http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=t3/fileadmin/ 
Documentos/BDL/2001/0008. 
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the basis for several Central American countries’ refugee policies, including Mexico’s. 
The refugee definition used in the Cartagena Declaration was derived from the 1969 
Organization of African Unity, which also expanded the original UN definition to include 
persons displaced due to generalized violence.45 The United States was not present for 
the creation of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and has never formally updated its 
refugee definition to include this larger category of displaced persons.46 As a 
consequence, barriers remain high for refugees finding their way to safety in the United 
States. 
Gil Loescher, James Milner, and Edward Newman published Protracted Refugee 
Situations: Politics, Human Rights, and Security through their work in with the UN. The 
book discusses protracted refugee situations, which are defined as any situation in which 
a refugee is left in political limbo, often in refugee camps or by requesting asylum from a 
host nation. At the time of their research, the majority of international refugees were 
considered to be in protracted situations, as opposed to emergent situations.47 Scholars 
have noted trends in developed nations that demonstrate public resistance to asylum 
seekers and those who find themselves in protracted migratory statuses.  
3. The American Dream 
The United States has historically had great appeal as a destination for any type of 
immigrant. The national rhetoric surrounding immigration law and policy in the United 
States is that the country is a nation consistently welcoming of immigrants: “America is 
the largest and by far the most important immigrant-receiving country in the world and is 
seen, not only by people inside the United States but also by billions of others around the 
world, as the land of opportunity, a place where anyone from anywhere in the world 
                                                 
45 UNHCR, OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Geneva, 
Switzerland: UNHCR, 1969). 
46 “Cartagena +30,” UNHCR, accessed May 10, 2015, http://www.acnur.org/cartagena30/en/ 
background-and-challenges/. 
47 Gil Loescher, James Milner, and Edward Newman, Protracted Refugee Situations: Politics, Human 
Rights, and Security (Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press, 2008), 20, 46. 
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could have a chance of success.”48 The United States dominates the world’s landscape in 
the sheer number of immigrants who are welcomed into the country. In 2013, the United 
States took in 69,926 refugees of the 70,000 authorized by Congress.49 That same year, 
the United States received 88,400 requests for asylum.50 Asylum requests went up 25 
percent from the previous year, largely due to the increased requests from Syrians, 
Hondurans, and Egyptians.51 According to the country operations profiles for the 
UNHCR, the United States and Germany have 455,048 and 455,081 refugees and asylum 
seekers in the country, respectively.52 Germany has the largest number compared to any 
other country in the European Union. Canada has 165,874.53 Scholar Elizabeth Cohen 
calls this phenomenon the “public philosophy of immigration,” and argues that these 
ideals must mirror the actions taken in a country to create and enforce immigration 
policies.54   
Despite the United States’ generous immigration policies, research suggests that 
public attitudes in the United States are not quite as generous. In fact, the public is 
generally not in favor of expanding immigration programs.55 Scholar Peter Schuck 
summarized the following general attitudes of the American public, based on survey data 
from 1997: 
Americans like immigrants more than they like immigration, favor past 
immigration more than recent immigration, prefer legal immigrants to 
illegal ones, prefer refugees to other immigrants, support immigrants’ 
                                                 
48 Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations (Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association, 2011), 42. 
49 “FY 13 Refugee Admissions Statistics,” Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, last modified July 1, 2014, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/228666.htm. 
50 “UNHCR Asylum Trends 2013,” UNHCR, last modified March 26, 2014, 
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51 “UNHCR Asylum Trends 2013,” UNHCR. 
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access to educational and health benefits but not to welfare or social 
security, and feel that immigrants’ distinctive cultures have contributed 
positively to American life and that diversity continues to strengthen 
American society today.56 
It is important to note Schuck’s finding that Americans “prefer refugees to other 
immigrants.” Based on this information, there appears to be a disconnect between 
national values, immigration policies, and public opinion on immigration matters. 
Americans rely on individual achievement and success, as opposed to a larger 
collective group success. In examining psychological considerations of a population such 
as refugees or asylum seekers, it is essential to recognize the importance of group 
membership and categorization. Social identity theory tells us that all humans categorize 
their social groups based on perceptions of where their own “ingroup” fits in relationship 
to other social “outgroups.”57 Author Fathali Moghaddam is quick to point out that, 
although the actual process of social categorization is shared among all humans (we all 
do it), the categories and boundaries differ based on social and political factors.58 The 
American rhetoric that promotes immigration is furthered by the attraction that, when an 
immigrant does make it to the United States, social classes in America are fluid. A major 
component driving this momentum is the American orientation toward “self-contained 
individualism.”59 Not only can a person get to the United States, but he or she can then 
work hard to achieve the “American dream.” In a long-term study of Latin American 
migrants coming to the United States, the overwhelming number of interviewed subjects 
reported that their main motivation in coming to the United States was the “dream” of 
improving their lives.60 
                                                 
56 Schuck, “The Disconnect.” 
57 John C. Turner, Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, ed. Henri Tajfel (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), 17–28.  
58 Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, 38-40. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Douglas S. Massey and Magaly Sanchez-R, Brokered Boundaries: Creating Immigrant Identity in 
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C. METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCH 
The three countries selected for use as case studies (Honduras, Cuba, and Syria) 
each present unique challenges to U.S. humanitarian immigration policy. The countries 
are explored in great detail using fictional scenarios and characters who interact with U.S. 
immigration programs available to them. The case studies feature real places, trends, and 
migratory events. Humans are naturally wired to tell and listen to stories in order to 
produce empathy among fellow humans. The dialog was created to allow readers to better 
empathize with the realities faced by the specific population that seeks international 
assistance.  
Empathy is an incredibly powerful emotion and source of social contract.61 
Empathy, or the process of understanding a fellow being through his or her experience, is 
not to be confused with sympathy.62 Sympathy is considered an observational emotion—
feeling bad about another person’s situation—but empathy “is a type of vicarious 
emotion: it’s feeling what one takes another person to be feeling.”63 New York 
University Professor of Psychology Martin L. Hoffman has studied the relationship 
between human empathy and moral development. Of specific interest to Hoffman is the 
internal human emotional struggle between caring and justice.64 On one hand, humans 
are biologically wired to care about fellow human beings; “humans are built in such a 
way that they can involuntarily and forcefully experience another’s emotion—that their 
distress is often contingent not on their own, but someone else’s painful experience.”65 
Human empathy can also extend into a feeling of injustice when humans see good people 
suffer from an unfair system.66 If a human being lacks the ability to empathize with other 
human beings, psychological research suggests that this inability signals the presence of a 
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62 “All About Empathy,” Psychology Today, accessed December 22, 2015, 
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major psychological disorder such as antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic 
disorder.67  
The ability to form empathy is a natural and healthy human condition. It is one of 
the emotions necessary to produce morality at its most basic level. Primate behavior 
researcher Frans de Waal suggests that empathy is a basic animal instinct shared among 
primates and humans.68 During a 2013 CNN interview, in a segment called, “He Studies 
Where Morals Come From,” de Waal explains that morality is older than religion: “Very 
long ago our ancestors had moral systems. Our current institutions are only a couple of 
thousand years old, which is really not old in the eyes of a biologist.”69 Empathy is a part 
of our ancestral biological makeup. An immigration system is designed for and used by 
human beings. Empathy is a necessary and natural part of human interaction within that 
system.  
All healthy human beings are empathetic to some degree, but empathy should be 
counterbalanced by a consideration of other factors, such as a person’s history, culture, 
and environment.70 Factors outside the human mind contribute to a person’s unique 
worldview, whether that person is an immigrant or an American-born citizen. One’s own 
accepted social patterns can cause distortion and even imaginative resistance when trying 
to understand another person’s behavior.71 Imaginative resistance is the reason that 
people are unable to fathom certain human behaviors. For example, if an American 
citizen were to encounter an unaccompanied immigrant child in the southwest desert 
seeking to enter the United States unlawfully, the American citizen’s empathy may be 
blocked due to imaginative resistance. The citizen may be completely unable to see how 
the child’s parents would allow for such an action or why the child would be willing to 
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comply. It is at this point that the American citizen must try to rely on his or her 
understanding of the factors beyond empathy—the child’s history, culture, and 
environment—to see the totality of the situation. Humanitarian immigration is ultimately 
a human experience. The urgent need that surrounds an individual’s decision to migrate is 
not fixed in time. It is a personal human decision that gradually arises within a cultural 
context following a series of life events, and is best understood through empathy and 
narration. Narratives help readers “make sense” of highly complex information. Narration 
or storytelling is recommended as a learning tool, particularly for use by organizations 
and adult learners.72  
The experience of humanitarian immigration from Honduras, Cuba, and Syria can 
only be understood by incorporating elements of the immigrants’ history, culture, policy, 
laws, motivations, and opportunities. Narrative inquiry, or studying the stories of 
subjects, is a research tool that incorporates individual and societal contexts.73 Case 
studies are the best choice for instructors or authors who wish to focus their readers on a 
process.74 As researcher D. B. Bromley explains, case studies “get as close to the subject 
of interest as they possibly can, partly by their access to subjective factors (thoughts, 
feelings, and desires), whereas experiments and surveys often use convenient derivative 
data, e.g., test results, official records. Also, case studies tend to spread the net for 
evidence widely, whereas experiments and surveys usually have a narrow focus.”75  
The fictional scenarios presented in this research are carefully crafted to show 
systematically all U.S. humanitarian immigration programs available for three countries 
of interest: Honduras, Cuba, and Syria. Other details have been included to provide 
context that explains why and how those programs exist for immigrants from those 
locations. The end product is similar to what researchers D. Jean Clandinin and F. 
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Michael Connelly explain as “‘grand contraptions’ built on multiple, fluid foundations, 
and formed into ambiguous shapes that may ring more, or less, crisp and clear as one 
thing from one vantage point and another from another vantage point.”76 Narratives are 
used to convey information as a part of daily life, and represent a natural way to organize 
and explain human experience.77 However, it is important, particularly when dealing 
with narrative texts, to provide some general structure or format so that readers have a 
clear understanding of what is intended to be presented through the narration.78 
While fictional scenarios help develop empathy, display cultural context, and 
otherwise humanize a complex legal issue, immigration policy is created with little 
regard for the immigrant’s point of view. Primary sources that document an immigrant’s 
migratory experience do not typically capture all the immigration policies affecting an 
immigrant’s personal decisions. The policies and statistics do not explain who applies or 
who qualifies for the programs. Alternatively, actual immigration case decisions for 
asylum seekers and refugees in the United States remain confidential under strict privacy 
laws and do not capture the origins of a migrant’s journey. Each single set of sources fails 
to tell the entire story. The narratives created through this research attempt to explore the 
complexity of human immigration through the entire process.    
The fictional scenarios yield comprehensive explanations and factual possibilities. 
The scenarios do not focus on the routes or means used for migratory travel but rather on 
the motivations of the immigrant, the legal immigration options available, and the 
decisions immigrants make based on those options. Some immigrants are successful in 
their pursuits, while others are not. The different pathways used by the immigrants in the 
scenarios to obtain varying degrees of lawful immigration status are based on U.S. 
government statistics. Within the fictional scenarios, there is a complete overview of U.S. 
humanitarian immigration policy and the programs available for immigrants from 
Honduras, Cuba, and Syria. This review includes a detailed description of the programs 
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in use and a brief history of U.S. political intervention through immigration, starting with 
U.S. policies such as Temporary Protected Status, the Cuban Adjustment Act, and the 
U.S. Refugee Program.  
After presenting the U.S. humanitarian immigration policy options in use for the 
three countries and case studies, the research analyzes how humanitarian immigration 
laws and programs relate to national security objectives. Many U.S. immigration 
programs were designed as an urgent humanitarian response to a particular event in a 
specific country and operate independently of one another. A reactive approach to 
solving migratory crises results in a fragmented response with complicated rules and 
occasional contradictions for the very populations they intend to assist. This research 
provides a series of recommendations to create a more a unified approach for 
humanitarian immigration policy by viewing the entire problem from the eyes of 
displaced immigrants, and in pursuit of the American public’s best interests and security. 
D. DISCLAIMER 
This research is guided by the unique perspective of the author, Catherine 
Ventura, who has worked as an immigration officer since 2002. During her career, Ms. 
Ventura has had the opportunity to formally represent the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) overseas as a diplomat in Central America and Asia. Ms. Ventura has 
first-hand experience listening to the personal narratives of refugees and adjudicating 
matters of humanitarian immigration law. The opinions expressed in this document are 
those of the author and do not represent or reflect the opinions of the Department of 
Homeland Security. The narratives used in this research are works of fiction based on 
actual places, events, and immigration programs. Names, characters, and businesses are 
either the products of the author’s imagination or used in a fictitious manner. Any 
resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, is purely coincidental. 
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II. CASE STUDY: HONDURAS 
A. COUNTRY CONTEXT 
Honduras is used as the first case study because it is geographically connected to 
the United States. An emergent migratory situation occurred at the southern border of the 
United States in 2013 and 2014, when thousands of undocumented immigrants, many of 
whom were women and minors, fled Honduras and Central America on foot to seek 
refuge in the United States. The U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee 
suggested that Central Americans were coming to the United States illegally on foot 
because it could afford them asylum.79 In 2014, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol 
apprehended 51,705 unaccompanied minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras—more than double the number of minors detained in the previous year.80 
Testimony made to Congress by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Associate 
Director of the U.S. Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate on July 
7, 2015, stated that 92 percent of the unaccompanied minors who filed for asylum status 
were from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, with an overall approval rate of 42.6 
percent.81 Although asylum can be granted in some of the cases, the United States has not 
allowed for the systematic screening of refugees in any Central American country 
because most Central American applicants do not meet the current U.S. legal definition 
of a refugee. 
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Recent studies and news articles confirm the proliferation of organized crime, 
drug cartels, gangs, and violence in Central America. The northern triangle of Central 
America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) is currently one of the most violent 
areas in the world.82 Honduras is the single most popular entry point for U.S.-bound 
cocaine shipments from South America.83 Honduras also has the world’s highest murder 
rate, according to the two most recent UN Global Studies on Homicide. The United 
States does not accept refugees who are victims of general violence unless the violence is 
based on one of the five protected grounds: race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, or 
membership in a particular social group.84 Thus, according to the last five annual reports 
published by the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, 
the United States has accepted a total of 25 Honduran refugees.85  
On the other hand, Hondurans have had ongoing Temporary Protected Status in 
the United States because of a humanitarian crisis caused by the environment. In 1997, 
Hurricane Mitch devastated the country.86 There are more than 300,000 Temporary 
Protected Status recipients from 12 different countries in the United States today. 
Together, immigrants from Honduras and El Salvador make up approximately 265,000 of 
these recipients.87 David North of the Center for Immigration Studies points out that no 
country has been removed from the U.S. Temporary Protected Status list since 2009, but 
the number of recipients is decreasing. Those who qualify find it difficult to submit the 
annual renewal paperwork and fees, and instead choose to live in the United States 
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without lawful immigration status.88 An effort made by the 113th Congress in 2013 
would have allowed Temporary Protected Recipients to convert to Lawful Permanent 
Resident status as part of a Comprehensive Immigration Reform, but the bill never passed 
in the House of Representatives.89  
Human Rights Watch, a non-governmental organization, has demonstrated that 
Hondurans and other Central Americans who claim asylum and wait for a deportation 
hearing endure the lengthy psychological trauma of an uncertain future.90 These refugees 
and the recipients of Temporary Protected Status fall under the protracted refugee 
category.91 Scholars Sarah Blanchard, Erin R. Hamilton, Nestor Rodriguez, and 
Hirotoshi Yoshioka examined the increasing Honduran immigration and deportation 
trend through a demographic study that considered multiple factors including gang 
activity, increasing levels of violence in Honduras, and an overall lack of scholarly 
attention paid to the country.92 In response to the migratory crisis of 2014, the United 
States opened a very small in-country refugee-processing program for Central American 
minors. The program has not received significant media attention and features 
complicated rules and requirements.93 Today, the debate on how to handle this 
humanitarian immigration crisis continues even after significant public pressure and a 
U.S. District Court judge ordered the immediate release of minors and mothers from the 
immigration detention centers.94 Prolonged periods of violence and environmental 
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disasters can trigger patterns of forced humanitarian migration; such is the case in Central 
America. 
B. FICTIONAL SCENARIO 
Carolina tapped nervously on her luggage as she waited outside the international 
terminal in Orlando, Florida. She put her passport back in her purse and hoped she 
would recognize her cousin Jessica. Carolina had not seen Jessica in over 20 years. A 
wave of sadness swept over Carolina as she looked over at her husband and their two 
children sitting next to her. The kids had no idea they were not returning to Honduras. It 
was best not to tell them everything at once. For now, it was a vacation and a trip to 
Disney World. 
Carolina had fallen in love with the idea of being a journalist in high school and 
went on to study communications and public relations at the University of San Pedro 
Sula.95 She even helped start the school’s first campus TV station, which was now the 
only HD channel broadcasting in Honduras.96 Until the present, Carolina had worked 
for a television network called Televicentro Honduras for 10 years. It was a great job, 
and it allowed her to live her dream of being a news broadcaster in her hometown of San 
Pedro Sula. But in July, Herlyn Espinal, another reporter working for the Hoy Mismo 
show on the same network, had been killed. The murder investigation never went 
anywhere. More than 30 journalists had been killed in Honduras from 2010–2013, and 
no one was brought to justice.97 Carolina’s home was now the world’s most dangerous 
city. How did it happen so fast?  
She just couldn’t do it any longer. Carolina’s entire family was from Honduras 
and she had lived there her whole life. She was proud of all she had accomplished and 
could not imagine starting over in the United States, but she had no choice. 
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Carolina watched the cars as they slowed and stopped under the American 
Airlines signs, searching hard for her cousin’s familiar face. 
The first threat had come last December, over the phone, right after Televicentro 
ran her story covering President Juan Orlando Hernandez’s speech on crime. The 
president remarked that at least 80 percent of all crime in Honduras was related to drug 
trafficking.98 This was no secret. Former President Porfirio Lobo and current President 
Juan Orlando Hernandez were supposed to be different. The 2009 coup was supposed to 
change things.99  
Carolina had to work late that night, editing footage, but her driver took her 
home around 8:30 p.m. The kids were already in their pajamas. The housekeeper said 
goodnight and went to her room, just past the kitchen. Carolina’s husband was out that 
evening, watching the Marathon game at a bar.100 Carolina got the kids ready for bed. 
Finally, around 9:30 p.m., she sat down at the table with a plate for dinner when her cell 
phone rang from an unknown number.101 The caller was a man who did not identify 
himself. He told Carolina she was late paying her rent. There must be some mistake, 
Carolina responded; she owned her house. No—Mara Salvatrucha owned her block, the 
man told her, and her rent was past due. The phone changed hands and a second man 
threatened to spray her house with bullets. He knew Herlyn and that Carolina worked for 
Televicentro. He knew the name of her children’s school. The first caller came back on 
the line and said Carolina must pay $2,000 U.S. dollars to ensure her immediate 
protection. Someone would pick up the money in three days. The caller instructed her to 
keep her phone close for more instructions. Rent always had to be paid on time, or 
Carolina would be reporting the news of her own kids’ untimely deaths.     
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As soon as the caller hung up, Carolina realized she was shaking. Not wanting to 
scare the kids, she tiptoed over to the security camera screens and checked around 
outside their front gate. Nothing seemed out of the ordinary, but she immediately phoned 
her husband, Carlos. The bar was loud in the background. Carolina spoke quickly, in her 
matter-of-fact reporter’s voice, and told Carlos what had happened. Carlos told her he 
was coming home and instructed Carolina to call the Departamento Nacional de 
Investigaciones Criminales (DNIC) immediately.  
Carolina contacted one of her investigator friends who worked for the DNIC. 
Everyone there knew Carolina from her work at Televicentro. The DNIC was the top 
Honduran law enforcement agency dedicated to countering violence, and worked 
regularly with officials at the U.S. Embassy to help bring important criminals to justice 
through the Honduran court system or extradition to the United States.102 But Carolina 
knew her phone call to DNIC was like throwing a bucket of water at a forest fire—it 
would not be enough.  
Her friend from the DNIC dispatched two officers to her house to complete a 
formal report. The DNIC wrote down her cell phone number and agreed to open a formal 
file for Carolina in case any future incidents occurred. When Carlos arrived home, he 
hugged his wife and made sure their own security guard (armed with a military-issued 
Galil rifle) stayed overnight at the house.103 Carolina felt more and more danger 
surrounding her job and her city, especially after Herlyn’s murder. Daily incidents of 
violence and countless murders went unsolved.104 When did it all get so bad? 
The next day, Carolina and her family left to stay with friends in Tegucigalpa. She 
used her contacts to schedule a personal meeting with U.S. Embassy representatives to 
discuss her situation. She wondered if she had any options for asylum in the United 
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States, given her position in journalism, the recent threat, and the high level of danger for 
all Honduran journalists. The Embassy officials explained that Carolina could use her 
valid visitor’s visa if she needed to take a break from everything for a few weeks. 
Otherwise she could register with the United Nations office in San Jose, Costa Rica, 
which had jurisdiction over refugee concerns in Central America.105 She had no other 
immigration options unless she could find a company in the U.S. to sponsor a work visa. 
There was nothing they could do to assist Carolina directly from Honduras.  
“Hola, mi prima!!!” Carolina snapped into the present moment as she saw a 
woman with gold-rimmed aviator sunglasses and a long gold necklace open her car door 
and trot over with outstretched arms.  
“Ay, yay, yay, Jessica! Tanto tiempo…” said Carolina. It had been so long since 
she’d seen her cousin, but somehow it didn’t matter. Carolina hugged her hard, relieved 
to see family. They piled the luggage and the kids into the car. Jessica explained that her 
daughter was waiting for them at the house, but that her son was still in the town of El 
Progreso with their grandmother. Carolina decided not to say anything yet to Jessica 
about the rumors of Jessica’s son leaving El Progreso for the United States several 
months ago. Carolina was not that close to this side of the family.  
Jessica remarked that the last time they had seen one another was before the 
hurricane in 1997, and Carolina sadly agreed. That same year, Jessica had run away to 
the United States by herself without any papers and never returned home. Luckily for 
Jessica, the United States was allowing Hondurans to register for Temporary Protected 
Status after the hurricane. Jessica had expected to stay for a few months, maybe a year or 
two, but the Temporary Protected Status made it much easier for her to find a job and 
send money back to the family, so she stayed. Jessica’s departure was a shock to her 
whole family, especially their grandmother, who was left to care for Jessica’s two-year-
old son.  
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Carolina’s mother often said that her sister’s family would always be poor. But as 
Carolina rode through the quiet suburban streets of Orlando in her cousin’s car, she 
didn’t think Jessica looked poor at all. Not that it mattered. Carolina was just happy to 
see a familiar face. She had no other family in the United States, and she knew she 
couldn’t return to Honduras. It wasn’t safe for them. They would have to find a way to 
stay. 
C. IMMIGRATION OPTIONS 
There are multiple U.S. humanitarian immigration programs at work for or of 
interest to Carolina’s fictitious Honduran family. Carolina had no issue entering the 
United States through the Orlando International Airport because she had a B-2 visitor’s 
visa issued by the U.S. Embassy in Honduras. The Department of State notes that the 
ability for an applicant to pay for his or her trip and otherwise establish economic ties to 
his or her home country is a strong factor when determining eligibility for a visitor’s 
visa.106 Carolina was well-educated and had long-time employment with Televicentro, a 
stable Honduran employer. Carolina and her family owned a home and could provide 
documentation of a bank account with sufficient funds to cover the costs of international 
travel.  
This type of evidence is reviewed by a Department of State Consular officer 
during a face-to-face non-immigrant visa interview. The Department of State also 
photographs and fingerprints all visitor visa applicants and conducts a background check 
to determine if visa issuance is appropriate. There is no formal appeal process available 
to foreign nationals who receive a negative determination made by the consular officer. 
Anyone denied a visitor’s visa is encouraged to reapply in the future. There are many 
other types of visas (e.g., family visas, student visas, work-based visas), each with their 
own requirements. As this study pertains to humanitarian immigration programs, other 
work and family-based visa options are not covered. 
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Cousin Jessica entered the United States without legal status in 1997. As a young 
single woman with limited economic means and no stable employment, it would have 
been difficult for Jessica to obtain a B-2 visitor’s visa from the U.S. Embassy in 
Honduras in order to enter the country legally. Because Honduras is geographically 
connected to the United States by way of Mexico and Guatemala, its geography offers an 
alternative for those willing to risk the danger of an illegal entry by land through the 
southern border of the United States. When Jessica entered the United States in the late 
1990s, Honduras was a very poor country. The Gross National Income (GNI) for 
Honduras, as calculated by the World Bank in U.S. dollars, fluctuated between $660 and 
$920 from 1996 to 2000. The GNI for the United States was between $30,380 and 
$36,070 during the same time period.107 Jessica would have weighed the dangers 
associated with an unlawful entry into the United States and determined that those 
potential dangers were preferable to her current living situation and/or future 
opportunities in Honduras. Jessica then made the journey north.  
1. Temporary Protected Status 
Luckily for our fictional character, Jessica, Hurricane Mitch struck Central 
America shortly after her unlawful entry into the United States. Hurricane Mitch was 
reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as being the most 
deadly Atlantic hurricane since 1780.108 The storm lasted from October 26 until 
November 4, 1998, and devastated major infrastructure in several Central American and 
Caribbean countries. Honduras reported 6,500 confirmed deaths and an estimated  
$4 billion in damages.109 On January 5, 1999, the attorney general for the U.S. 
Department of Justice declared that all Honduran nationals physically present in the 
United States (whether or not they had lawful immigration status) could remain in the 
United States under the Temporary Protected Status program. Temporary Protected 
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Status occurs when the attorney general (now Secretary of Homeland Security) 
designates a particular country as incapable of receiving its own citizens due to 
extraordinary circumstances such as an armed conflict, epidemic, or environmental 
catastrophe. There is a specific registration period and a foreign citizen must be present in 
the United States (legally or illegally) at the time of designation in order to qualify.110 
Temporary Protected Status was not designed to be a long-term or permanent 
immigration solution. It is a temporary remedy for foreign nationals who cannot return to 
their countries of origin because of an urgent humanitarian need. Central Americans who 
qualified for Temporary Protected Status in 1998–1999 are still renewing their temporary 
status today. Temporary Protected Status does not lead to any form of lawful permanent 
residence in the United States. Instead, it affords qualifying foreign nationals the right to 
work legally in the country by receiving an Employment Authorization Card. Temporary 
Protected Status also affords its recipients the ability to travel temporarily outside the 
United States, including but not limited to the ability to return to their country of 
origin.111 There are approximately 61,000 Honduran nationals in the United States who 
have received Temporary Protected Status benefits since 1998.112 
Honduras’ continued need for Temporary Protected Status has been debated over 
the years. Both former Honduran Secretary of Foreign Affairs Mario Canahuati and 
former Honduran President Porfirio Lobo publicly sought continued U.S. support of the 
Temporary Protected Status program for Honduras.113 In the most recent announcement 
issued in the Federal Register, the U.S. government explained, “Over the past year, DHS 
and the Department of State (DOS) have continued to review conditions in Honduras. 
Based on this review and after consulting with DOS, the Secretary [of Homeland 
Security] has determined that an 18-month extension is warranted because the disruption 
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in living conditions in affected areas of Honduras resulting from the environmental 
disaster that prompted the January 5, 1999 designation persists.”114 No single country has 
been removed from the list of Temporary Protected Status recipients since 2009.115 
Surprisingly, the number of Temporary Protected Status recipients has decreased over the 
years. Critics of the program’s long-term use suggest that the number of participants 
decreased mostly because recipients no longer believe that their lack of a lawful 
immigration status will be enforced.116  
The fictional character, Jessica, renewed her Temporary Protected Status and 
work authorization in the United States for nearly 20 years. Her status is similar to that of 
any other temporary visitor, student, or foreign worker. Because Jessica cannot convert 
her “temporary” status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident, she is unable to petition 
for any family members, including her son left in Honduras in 1997. 
… 
Jessica and Carolina talked at the kitchen table well into the night. Jessica sadly 
reported that, according to family in Honduras, her son had left weeks ago, presumably 
heading to the United States through Guatemala and Mexico with a coyote. Jessica said 
it was hard for her to sleep while thinking of what may have become of him. All she could 
do was wait and hope for the best. Carolina seized the moment and confided in her 
cousin that she and her husband had no intentions of returning to Honduras. Carolina 
explained how she had been threatened and how it was no longer safe for them there. As 
the words left her lips, Carolina felt suddenly embarrassed at the situation in which she 
found herself. A sadness crept into the pit of her stomach. Jessica looked deeply at 
Carolina’s worried face and said she completely understood. Jessica had seen all the 
horrible news from Honduras. Jessica immediately told Carolina they could stay with her 
for as long as they needed. Carolina looked around at the apartment and her children 
sleeping on the living room floor. Carolina hoped this cramped situation would be 
temporary. Jessica also gave Carolina a business card for a good immigration attorney 
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she knew who helped her renew her Temporary Protected Status and employment cards 
on time. Carolina took the information from her cousin and promised to call in the 
morning.  
Carolina started to get ready for bed and remembered how little she had packed 
for the trip. It would have raised too much suspicion with the inspectors at the airport. 
Their few things would have to be enough for now, but how long would their money last? 
How long would it take to find jobs? Carolina had strong English skills and a few 
business contacts in the United States, but would she even be allowed to work legally? 
She never thought she would be afraid to remain in her homeland. These complicated 
emotions weighed on her mind and on her heart as she said goodnight to her children in 
their new, unstable home.  
The next day, two important phone calls happened. First, Carolina called the 
immigration attorney and set up an appointment to discuss her case in greater detail. 
Later that afternoon, a second call—this one for Jessica—came in. The call was from 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The officer stated that a young man by the name of 
Nestor was being detained, and Jessica’s phone number was listed for his closest relative 
in the United States.  
“Yes,” said Jessica, her heart racing immediately and impatiently, “Nestor is my 
son.”  
As the news truly hit her, Jessica began to shake and soon burst into sobs. She 
dropped the phone and fell to the floor.  
Carolina heard the commotion from the other room and ran over to pick up the 
phone.  
“Señora?” said a voice on the other end, “Señora?” the voice was more urgent.  
“Yes, this is the family of Nestor Hidalgo,” said Carolina, helping still-sobbing 
Jessica onto a kitchen chair.  
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The children and Carlos soon overheard the commotion and ran into the kitchen 
inquisitively. Carolina gestured to Carlos to wait for one moment. She was struggling to 
understand the accent of the officer on the phone.  
He spoke in Spanish, but it was not the Honduran Spanish Carolina was used to 
hearing. “Señora, your contact information will be added to this boy’s case file. Please 
state your full name and address for the record…”  
Carolina provided as much information as she could with the help of Jessica, who 
was still trembling. The officer provided Nestor’s immigration case number, and 
Carolina wrote it down on a piece of paper. “Nestor Hidalgo will be transferred to a 
group home for minors run by the Office of Refugee Resettlement under the Department 
of Health and Human Services to await his deportation hearing, unless you folks want to 
come here to San Antonio and bond him out. Mr. Hidalgo is not allowed to receive 
personal phone calls while in detention. The Office of Refugee Resettlement will contact 
you in the morning to provide further information and explain how things will proceed 
from here.” 
“Can we please talk to Nestor?” Carolina stammered.  
“One moment, señora. Yes, we will put him on the phone.” Carolina nudged her 
cousin gently, who still sat unsteadily at the table, her head buried in her hands. 
 Jessica looked up, and Carolina whispered that it was Nestor, holding out the 
phone. “Hello? Hello, Mami…” the young man’s voice echoed, scared, from the other 
end of the line.  
“I can’t…” Jessica mouthed, shaking her head softly but rapidly. “Hello, love. 
This is your Aunty Carolina. We are staying at your mom’s house here in Orlando. Look, 
your mom can’t talk right now, but don’t worry. We will fix everything. We’re just happy 
to know you are okay. Right now, the officers are going to take you somewhere safe, a 
place to stay for a little while. Don’t be scared. Do what the officers say. We will talk to 
them in the morning and figure things out. You will be okay.”  
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Carolina struggled to stay calm and keep from crying herself. She had no idea 
what fate awaited Nestor, but he was family after all. She could not imagine what he had 
endured to get all the way to the United States on foot.  
“Aunty, I am so tired. I have no idea what is going on. The coyote just left us. He 
took all our money and left the ten of us in the desert. He said someone would pick us up, 
but no one ever came. We walked for days. We ran out of food. Water. Everything. Then 
Immigration caught us. Three managed to escape, but I was too tired to run. I’m so sorry. 
Tell my mother I am so, so sorry...” his voice trailed off.  
“Don’t worry, Nestor,” said Carolina. “It’s only for a little while. You are safe 
there and we will talk to a lawyer tomorrow so your mom can come and see you. For 
now, get some rest.” 
2. Options for Children 
Nestor represents one of thousands of children who have attempted to enter the 
United States at the southern border after traveling by land through Central America and 
Mexico. Since 2012, the number of children detained at the southern border has risen 
significantly. According to U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, 67,339 unaccompanied 
children were encountered at the southern border of the United States between October 1, 
2013, and September 30, 2014.117 Children are subject to the unilateral enforcement of 
most immigration laws, including the law that requires each foreign person seeking 
admission into the United States to present a valid passport and visa at a designated port 
of entry.118 Children who attempt to enter the country without valid travel documents are 
arrested and detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection to await a removal hearing 
before an immigration judge. After arrest, if a child can establish that he or she has family 
in the United States, the child can be transferred to the Office of Refugee Resettlement, 
under the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The Office of Refugee 
Resettlement allows the family to house the child while he or she awaits the deportation 
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hearing.119 If a child is traveling with his or her parent and the entire family is detained, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection will transfer the family to a family detention center. 
Due to the backlog of cases awaiting a hearing in immigration court, minors and families 
can be detained for months, or even years.120 
The U.S. departments of Homeland Security and Justice have recognized that the 
influx of unlawful immigrants is alarming. New public awareness campaigns feature 
posters in Spanish (such as the poster in Figure 1) that show the dangers of crossing the 
desert to an uncertain future in the United States: “I thought it would be easy for my son 
to get papers in the north, but it was not true. Our children are our future: We must 
protect them.”121  
Figure 1.  Border-Crossing Dangers Awareness Ad in Spanish 
 
U.S. government public awareness campaigns warn potential immigrants about the dangers of crossing 
unlawfully through the southwest desert. Source: “Our Children Are the Future: Protect them,” Customs 
and Border Protection, accessed November 3, 2015, http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/u122/Dangers 
%20Poster%201.jpg. 
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Information directly from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection website further 
explains: “The message from the U.S. government on immigration is clear—if you cross 
illegally into the United States: 
• You cannot earn a path to citizenship; 
• You are not eligible for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or 
[Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals]; 
• You will not get papers that allow you to stay; and 
• You are putting yourself, or your child, in danger.”122 
The public media campaign has good intentions. The journey through the desert is 
treacherous. No child should be subjected to these horrible conditions. But what happens 
after the children arrive in the United States? Is there truly no way for unaccompanied 
minors to “get papers?” Sending a strong public warning is important. If the Spanish-
speaking public believes the message being conveyed is a separate issue. The question 
central to this second part of the fictional scenario is clear: are U.S. humanitarian 
immigration programs available to unaccompanied children who arrive at the southern 
border?  
3. Special Immigrant Juveniles 
There is an immigration law that specifically benefits children who have been 
abused, neglected, or abandoned by one or both parents as determined by any U.S. state 
court. The law was created in 1990 and later amended in 2008 under the Trafficking 
Victims Protection and Reauthorization Act.123 Minors who qualify under this 
immigration category are categorized as “Special Immigrant Juveniles,” and this status 
leads to Lawful Permanent Residence and U.S. citizenship.124 In addition to proving 
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abuse, neglect, and/or abandonment, the state court in the United States must have 
jurisdiction to be able to “declare that you are a dependent of the court or to legally place 
you with a state agency, a private agency, or a private person and it is not in your best 
interests to return to your home country (or the country you last lived in).”125 Minors 
apprehended at the southern border are either reunited with biological parents and 
processed for removal proceedings or are transferred as wards of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services to reside with a friend or family member and later apply for 
Special Immigrant Juvenile status.126 In this situation, there exists a protection “gap.”  
Nestor would not qualify under the Special Immigrant Juvenile program because 
he seeks to be reunified with his biological mother in the United States. Nestor was not 
abused, neglected, or abandoned by his family. Minors who run away or leave their 
families in Honduras may qualify for Special Immigrant Juvenile status. These children 
are often determined by state courts to have been “abandoned” in the United States. 
4. T and U Visas 
There are two visas (T and U visas) designed for victims of human trafficking or 
victims of other certain crimes, respectively. In order to qualify for one of these visas, an 
applicant must prove a connection to criminal activity that occurred in the United States 
and/or extreme hardship if forced to return to their country of origin.127 Although there is 
some leniency in the consideration of a minor’s application, an adult applicant for a T- or 
U-visa must be formally sponsored by a U.S. law enforcement agency.128  
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Nestor may have been a victim of human trafficking during his journey between 
Honduras and Mexico, but the narrative indicates that Nestor was apprehended by 
Customs and Border Patrol officials immediately upon his entry into the country. The T 
and U visas are intended primarily to assist those individuals who were victimized as part 
of a criminal scheme that took place within the jurisdiction of United States.129 Without 
the corroboration of local law enforcement, Nestor would have difficulty proving his 
case.  
5. Deferred Action and Humanitarian Parole 
Deferred action and humanitarian parole are potential options for all humanitarian 
migrants, minors or otherwise. Deferred action simply means that the United States 
authorizes a discretionary suspension of its authority to act (usually to deport someone). 
A formalized Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program was introduced through 
an executive action by President Obama and formally announced by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security on June 15, 2012.130 The program was intended to provide an 
organized and expeditious manner for a specific population (in this case minors who were 
brought to the United States at a young age and remain in an unlawful status) to access 
the existing deferred action law to request temporary relief from deportation and 
employment authorization. To qualify under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
Program, immigrants must meet the following criteria: 
1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012 
2. Came to the United States before reaching their 16th birthday 
3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007, up to 
the present time 
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, and at the 
time of making the request for consideration  with United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
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5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012 
6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate of 
completion from high school, have obtained a general education 
development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged veteran of 
the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States 
7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or 
more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a threat to national 
security or public safety131 
When the Obama Administration announced that the program would be expanded 
to include the parents of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents, many believed 
that the program was overstepping the boundaries of the law and represented a type of 
massive amnesty.132 As a result, on December 3, 2014, 26 states filed an injunction 
against the federal government to stop President Obama’s executive action meant to 
expand the program.133 The injunction was upheld by a federal court of appeals on 
November 9, 2015.134 This decision means that no further expansion can be pursued. In 
the Honduran fictional scenario, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program 
would be eliminated from further consideration because Nestor just arrived in the United 
States and would therefore not meet the basic residence requirement. 
Humanitarian parole can be found under Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act. It is a rather vague section of law that allows a person to enter the 
United States for humanitarian reasons or for a significant public benefit.135 The law for 
humanitarian parole is not specific and has purposely been left open for interpretation and 
discretion. There is one general humanitarian parole program that anyone can apply for, 
and there are different programs for different countries and populations that all exist 
based on interpretations of the same humanitarian parole law. Some of these programs 
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are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, on Cuba. For now, this review focuses on 
the humanitarian parole program that can specifically assist immigrants from Honduras. 
A parole is different from a visa. Parole classification does not carry the same 
rules, restrictions, or time limits as a visa. A parole allows someone with humanitarian 
need to be admitted into the United States for one year at a time, for an indefinite period 
of time, as long as the need exists.136 Humanitarian parole also allows the recipient to be 
authorized for lawful employment in the United States. However, humanitarian parole is 
a temporary immigration category that does not lead to Lawful Permanent Residence or 
U.S. citizenship. Anyone can apply for general consideration of a humanitarian parole. It 
is not to be used to bypass other visa options, but if a person has no other options, a 
humanitarian parole can be issued at the discretion of the Department of Homeland 
Security, as long as the applicant demonstrates significant humanitarian need.137 
On December 1, 2014, the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services began accepting applications for a new program called the 
Central American Minors Refugee/Parole Program.138 The program is based on the 
humanitarian parole law and focuses attention on providing humanitarian parole or, in 
some cases, refugee status, for qualifying Central American minors who are still present 
in Central America. The program is intended to provide an alternative path for parents 
and children seeking to make the dangerous journey from Central America to the United 
States. The application process begins when the minor’s parent, who must be present in 
the United States, seeks to bring his or her child (under 21 years of age) to the United 
States. The parent can be in any of these types of immigration statuses: Permanent 
Resident Status, Temporary Protected Status, Parolee, Deferred Action, Deferred 
Enforced Departure, or Withholding of Removal.139 On November 17, 2015, the first six 
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teenagers processed through this new program arrived in the United States.140 The 
children entered the United States as refugees and count toward a total of 4,000 allocated 
refugee slots for Latin America and the Caribbean for fiscal year 2015.141 The U.S. 
Refugee Program is covered in greater detail in Chapter VI, on Syria. Up to this point, 
Honduras has had very little presence in the U.S. Refugee Program.  
The fictional character Nestor is already in the United States. The Central 
American Minors Program is only intended to provide an immigration solution for 
minors in Central America, albeit only as a temporary solution. Jessica and Nestor will 
have to wait and see what the attorney recommends. 
… 
Carolina and Jessica waited for their names to be called in the attorney’s waiting 
room. Carolina was surprised to see how busy the office was and how many Spanish-
speakers she heard. Carolina had asked her husband to stay at home with the kids. They 
had still not told the children anything about their plans to stay. Carolina thought it 
would be best to explain everything once she, more or less, had a plan. They had two 
months before school was scheduled to begin. That should be plenty of time to get their 
permanent paperwork…  
“Carolina Acosta and Jessica Hidalgo?” The receptionist called their names, and 
greeted them in perfect Spanish.  
They walked to a conference room at the end of a hallway where the receptionist 
offered them water or coffee and explained that the attorney would be with them shortly. 
A few moments later, a middle-aged Hispanic gentleman appeared. He wore a nice suit 
and shook their hands warmly. He knew Jessica well, since she had filed her annual 
Temporary Protected Status paperwork through this office. Jessica introduced Carolina 
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to the attorney, who explained he was an immigration attorney serving clients all over 
Orlando, as well as in North and Central Florida.  
Carolina and Jessica explained that they were seeking assistance with two 
separate matters. Jessica first explained the situation with her son, Nestor, who was 
detained by Immigration in Texas. The attorney took some notes, including Nestor’s 
immigration case number, and then explained that Jessica would likely be able to post a 
bond so that Nestor could be released into her custody. The attorney could also request 
to have Nestor’s immigration hearing moved to the immigration court in Orlando. The 
attorney could not make any promises about Nestor staying in the United States, but he 
remained hopeful. Nestor would file a request for asylum and the immigration judge 
would be lenient, knowing that Jessica was a recipient of Temporary Protected Status for 
so many years. 
Carolina then took her turn. She talked for a long time about their life in 
Honduras and their decision to move to the United States. The attorney explained that 
Carolina may be eligible to receive asylum—Carolina would apply as the principal 
asylum recipient for the entire family, as she was the one who suffered the direct criminal 
threats and had the position as a journalist. The attorney warned Carolina, however, that 
there were not many asylum requests approved for Honduran nationals, and it could take 
months to arrange a local interview at the Miami Asylum Office.142 The attorney 
explained that, if the case was approved after the interview, Carolina could apply for 
Lawful Permanent Residence. Even if the case was denied, Carolina would have another 
chance to plead her case before the immigration judge at the time of her removal 
hearing.  
Both women left the office feeling relieved. Jessica made plans to travel to the 
detention facility outside San Antonio so that she could post bond for Nestor. Carolina 
would stay at the house and gather the documents requested by the attorney. Everything 
would fall into place. How hard could it be? 
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6. Asylum Programs 
Carolina and her family entered the United States legally as visitors. Visitor visa 
entries allow for a maximum stay of six months. As visitors, Carolina and her family 
could legally remain in the country but they could not legally work or attend school. If 
the family could find an employment opportunity inside the United States, they could 
apply for a longer-term employment-based visa. But employment-based visa 
opportunities can be difficult to find and certain categories have lengthy waiting 
periods—a luxury Carolina does not have.143 For Carolina and Nestor, the only 
humanitarian immigration program for which they can possibly qualify is the U.S. 
Asylum Program. 
For most Hondurans seeking humanitarian protection in the United States, the 
only long-term option is to seek status through the U.S. Asylum Program. The U.S. 
Asylum Program mirrors the U.S. Refugee Program. In the United States, the difference 
between the refugee and asylum programs is the physical location of the migrant at the 
time of application. While refugees must be outside the United States, asylum seekers are 
already in the United States or at a port of entry.144 Both programs operate under the 
same legal definition of a refugee housed in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
to determine who is eligible: 
The term “refugee” means any person who is outside any country of such 
person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is 
outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who 
is unable or unwilling to return to,  and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution 
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.145   
Both refugee and asylum statuses can be granted in the United States only when a 
person has been or may be persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership 
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in a particular social group, or political opinion. Prolonged periods of violence and 
environmental disasters have also historically triggered conditions for forced migration to 
the United States, but these migrants do not qualify as refugees in the United States. 
Carolina and Nestor represent victims of a violent and turbulent situation, but based on 
the legal criteria used to grant asylum, these types of events do not meet the definition of 
political asylum.146 There was one humanitarian immigration program designed to assist 
Central Americans in the 1980s called the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American 
Relief Act (NACARA). NACARA was a special piece of legislation that was passed in 
1997 to provide permanent relief to Central Americans who fled to the United States and 
filed for asylum during political unrest in Nicaragua and Central America in the 1980s.147 
The program only benefits nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua who were 
physically present in the United States in 1990.148  
Carolina is planning to make an affirmative asylum request, which means she will 
make the request herself through an application submitted to U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, as opposed to requesting asylum defensively in front of an 
immigration judge after being placed in deportation proceedings.149 Current statistics 
show that in March of 2015, USCIS approved 42 percent of its adjudicated affirmative 
asylum cases.150 Nestor, on the other hand, will be making an asylum request during his 
deportation hearing. Special provisions often allow for minors to submit an application to 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, as opposed to providing testimony in front of 
an immigration judge.151 For Carolina and Nestor, their futures are uncertain at best. 
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D. SECURITY CONCERNS 
Honduras’ notoriety as one of the world’s most violent and crime-ridden nations 
is a relatively recent phenomena. As illustrated in Table 2, murder rates in Honduras 
nearly doubled from the years 2000–2012.152 The 2012 murder rate for Honduras was 91 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, whereas the 2012 murder rate for the United States 
was 4.7.153 
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Table 2.   Murder Rates in Honduras 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number 3176 3488 3623 4073 3639 3212 3118 3588 4455 5280 6236 7104 7172 6757 
Rate 50.9 54.8 55.8 61.4 53.8 46.6 44.3 50.0 60.8 70.7 81.8 91.8 91.0 84.3 
Adapted from “Global Study on Homicide,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, last modified April 13, 2015, 
https://data.unodc.org. 
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The U.S. Department of State has had an ongoing “travel warning” for U.S. 
citizens in effect for Honduras since November 21, 2012.156 The travel warning cites the 
fact that Honduras has maintained the world’s highest murder rates since 2010.157 The 
Peace Corps pulled all its volunteers out of the country in September 2012.158 More 
recently, on October 30, 2015, the U.S. Department of State issued the updated travel 
warning to “warn U.S. citizens that the level of crime and violence in Honduras remains 
critically high.”159 
In addition to widespread violence in Honduras, the country’s democratic 
processes are weak. Honduras has a long history of struggle between its independent 
military and the civilian-elected presidency. A political coup removed Honduran 
President Manuel Zelaya as recently as 2009. From 1932 to 1954, two dictators ran all of 
Honduran political affairs with relative stability. After a coup in 1956, a weak democracy 
was installed, but the military continued to intervene, remove elected leaders, and 
otherwise establish its own authority.160 The 1980s were marked by major internal 
struggles and insurgencies throughout Central America. The regional wars forced 
Honduras to balance democratic ambitions against periods of military intervention, 
economic development, and U.S. involvement.  
Honduras and the United States have maintained an allied relationship over the 
years. Honduran agriculture was exported to the United States beginning in the early 
1900s with the United Fruit Company and Standard Fruit Company. The United States 
protected these assets and its relationship with Honduras by offering economic aid and 
security assistance.161 During the 1980s, the U.S.-Honduran relationship increased in 
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importance due to the U.S. support of regional opposition fighting against the leftist 
government tendencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. To this day, the 
United States maintains a large military presence at the Soto Cano Air Force Base in 
Comayagua, Honduras.162 Honduran nationalists believe the nation’s continued 
dependence on the United States is degrading to its own sovereignty.163  
The United States’ diplomatic position in Latin America was challenged in 
Honduras during the 2009 military coup. The Obama administration and Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton were accused of not actively defending the democracy, despite 
international demands from the UN and the Organization of American States to reinstate 
the ousted President Manuel Zelaya.164 Hillary Clinton admitted in her memoir, Hard 
Choices, that the United States did not focus on reinstating President Zelaya after he was 
forcibly removed by the Honduran military.165 At the time, the United States determined 
that the best solution was to seek international support of an immediate election to 
replace Zelaya.166 The election was boycotted by some Honduran citizens.  
Many questioned the selection of the new president and the United States’ role in 
Honduran political affairs.167 The newly elected president, Porfirio Lobo, remained the 
Honduran president from 2010–2014, though confidence in the Honduran democratic 
system suffered.168 A lack of strong democracy directly correlates to the number of 
citizens who choose to immigrate to another country. The weak democracy also suggests 
the government is unable to provide basic needs and stability for its people.169  
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Former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras James Creagan blames the violence and 
corruption in Honduras on the prolific drug trade, stating, “The unfettered violence of 
today’s Honduras, and its neighbors, is caused by drugs, gangs and corruption. It is a 
choice of bribes or bullets, all driven by the market for coca leaf products.”170 Not even 
the former president, Porfirio Lobos, can escape the drug cartels. The former president’s 
son was arrested by the Drug Enforcement Agency in Haiti in 2015 on drug trafficking 
charges.171 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime found that, beginning in 2006, cocaine 
shipments have been trafficked more often through Central America than Mexico due to 
Mexico’s improved national security strategy.172 However, the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime also found that the violence in the areas of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador 
was proliferated by territorial gangs and was not the direct result of the drug trafficking 
activity. Instead, drug trafficking, along with many other types of crimes, provides 
financial incentive for gang control of certain areas.173  
The research conducted by the UN suggests that the rise in gang activity in 
Honduras is the result of weak institutions and a lack of law and order.174 There are 
estimated to be between 12,000 and 36,000 gang members in Honduras.175 There are 
13,500 police officers in Honduras, compared to 21,000 in El Salvador and 24,000 in 
Guatemala.176 Gangs typically attract members between the ages of 12 and 24.177 The 
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vast majority of homicide victims in Central America are between the ages of 15 and 
29.178  
E. CONCLUSION 
Whether migrants are fleeing gang violence, political instability, or both, 
thousands from Central America are drawn to the possibility of a better life in the United 
States. The United States did not have a clear response plan for this migration crisis and 
instead sought emergency funding, makeshift family detention centers, and ad-hoc 
legislation.179 U.S. politicians argued about whether to deport the minors or allow them 
to stay. Many point to Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program as the 
cause of the influx.180 In October of 2014, a bipartisan Congressional delegation visited 
Honduras and admitted that multiple factors are causing the influx of migrants.181  
The 2016 budget proves that the humanitarian crisis in Central America is of great 
concern to the U.S. government. An allocation of $1 billion was made “to support a long-
term, comprehensive strategy for Central America to minimize the pressures of illegal 
immigration on the United States.”182 It is unclear if this funding will have clear 
directives to help stem the flow of unlawful minor immigrants to the southern border of 
the United States. For now, political cartoons (such as the cartoon seen in Figure 2) force 
readers to question if the United States has a clear plan of action to end this humanitarian 
crisis. 
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Figure 2.  Political Cartoon Questioning Plan to Address Central American 
Minors Arriving at the Southern Border 
 
Source: Jimmy Margulies, “Migrant Children,” June 17, 2014, http://www.politicalcartoons.com/ 
cartoon/4bb41326-ef33-45df-a76d-b12f77dcb890.html. 
Honduran refugees are most often victims of gang violence and a government 
system that is unable to protect them. Additionally, Temporary Protected Status for 
Honduras has been in effect for environmental refugees who sought shelter from the 
effects of Hurricane Mitch in the late 1990s. Refugees of violence and environmental 
catastrophes do not qualify for consideration as refugees in the United States. 
Furthermore, there is no existing provision to allow those holding Temporary Protected 
Status to ever become Lawful Permanent Residents. The United States must develop a 
strategy to end long-term protracted refugees. 
A high number of refugees from Central America have traveled to and remain in 
the United States seeking safety. Drug cartels are more often stopping in Central America 
than in Mexico, with local gangs competing for control of the territory. Gangs in 
Honduras are responsible for the majority of violent acts and homicides to maintain their 
control over the drug routes. The democratic systems in Honduras are weak, which 
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furthers Honduran citizens’ desire to migrate. The United States has committed $1 billion 
in economic aid for Central America in 2016, but this spending plan must focus on the 
sources of local government instability and lawlessness.  
Large backlogs in the asylum and immigration court systems mean that Honduran 
immigrants can remain in an uncertain protracted migratory situation for months or even 
years. Prospects for Lawful Permanent Residence based on refugee claims of violence are 
not good, but the lengthy delays also provide false hopes. Unaccompanied minors can 
apply to become Lawful Permanent Residents under the Special Immigrant Juvenile 
program, provided they do not have parents in the United States, or those parents are 
unknown to the U.S. government. Minors who enter the country seeking to reunite with 
their parents do not qualify for consideration under the Special Immigrant Juvenile 
program. Minors who remain in Honduras, and who have parents in the United States, 
may be eligible for consideration under a new program called the Central American 
Minors Relief program, but this program has only successfully processed six minors 
since its inception in 2014. The U.S. government’s public warning against the dangers of 
unlawful migration for Central American minors does not match the reality that some 
minors can remain in the country and find permanent protection. There exists a 
tremendous disconnect between the public message and the reality of the legal 
circumstances for Honduran refugees. 
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III. CASE STUDY: CUBA 
A. COUNTRY CONTEXT 
Cuba is a unique historical example of U.S. humanitarian immigration solutions. 
The only communist dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba is located 90 miles 
away from the southern tip of Florida; it holds a strategic position relative to the United 
States—both geographically and politically.183 The U.S. Refugee Program is only 
allowed to accept a limited number of refugees based on allocated funds approved each 
year by Congress. In 2013, the United States accepted a total of 69,909 refugees.184 In 
2014 and 2015, the United States committed to accepting 70,000 refugees.185 The only 
exception to the total number of refugees accepted by the United States is for Cuban 
nationals. Currently, all Cuban nationals who arrive in the United States (legally or 
illegally) receive full financial assistance, Lawful Permanent Residence for themselves 
and family members, and a unique path to U.S. citizenship under special humanitarian 
legislation written to address the mass exodus of Cuban nationals in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The law is commonly known as the Cuban Adjustment Act and is responsible for the 
notorious “wet foot/dry foot” immigration policy, under which Cubans intercepted by 
U.S. authorities at sea are returned to Cuba, but Cubans who make it to dry land in the 
United States are allowed to remain permanently (see Figure 3).186  
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Figure 3.  Cuban Raft Intercepted at Sea 
 
Twelve Cuban migrants intercepted at sea onboard a 1951 Chevrolet truck. All Cubans intercepted at sea 
can be returned to Cuba under the “wet foot/dry foot” policy. Source: “12 Migrant in a 1951 Chevy 
Truck,” U.S. Coast Guard, June 2003, http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/cupic.asp. 
The Cuban Adjustment Act allows Cuban nationals to enter the United States 
under their own immigration category. They do not need to prove that they meet the 
definition of a refugee. There are no numerical limitations imposed by Congress, and 
Cuban nationals can enter the country legally or illegally. The Cuban Adjustment Act 
waives standard immigration requirements applied to all refugees who desire entry into 
the United States through humanitarian immigration programs. President Obama’s 
announcement that the United States would begin to normalize relations with communist 
Cuba—along with the establishment of a new U.S. Embassy in Cuba—presents 
complicated issues for this program in particular. Because of the Cuban Adjustment Act, 
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the U.S. Refugee Program, and an array of different humanitarian immigration programs, 
U.S. immigration rules are unique when it comes to Cuban nationals.187 
Current U.S. humanitarian immigration policy for Cuba dates back to the 1950s. 
During this time, the United States had one central focus of its foreign policy strategy, 
and that was to fight against the global spread of communism.188 The National Security 
Council Memorandum 68 provides a glimpse at the U.S. foreign policy after World War 
II that actually “embraced ‘two subsidiary policies.’ One was to foster, ‘a world 
environment in which the American system can survive and flourish,’ and the other was 
containment of the Soviet Union.”189 U.S. foreign policy was focused on providing a 
necessary foundation for growth and prosperity under a capitalist system.190 
Cuba had been very connected to the United States since the American victory 
over the Spanish in the Spanish American War.191 The United States assumed a dominant 
role in Cuban affairs after securing Cuban freedom from Spain on December 10, 1898.192 
The United States had already invested heavily in the Cuban sugar trade, and benefited 
from this close association.193 This tight relationship continued between the two nations 
until 1959 when the Cuban Revolution brought Fidel Castro to power.194 Fidel Castro 
and his revolutionary form of government represented a political ideology that was in 
direct conflict with American control and capitalism.195 The new Cuban government 
seized approximately $1 billion of U.S.-held industries in Cuba and converted them into 
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state property.196 President Eisenhower responded in the spring of 1960 with a U.S. 
embargo on major exports to Cuba, including sugar, oil, and guns.197 On October 19, 
1960, Eisenhower prohibited all U.S. exports to Cuba.198 With the escalation of tensions 
between the U.S. and Cuban governments, Fidel Castro forged an even stronger alliance 
with the Soviet Union, which agreed to provide substantial military support to help 
Cuba’s communist revolution.199 It remains widely debated whether Fidel Castro always 
wanted a communist government in Cuba, or was pushed toward this decision in response 
to U.S. aggression.200 President Eisenhower formally severed all diplomatic ties with 
Cuba on January 3, 1961, just two weeks before John F. Kennedy took over as President 
of the United States.201 
Understanding the gravity of the first communist nation in the Americas, new 
U.S. President John F. Kennedy took immediate action to oust Fidel Castro and his 
communist regime in Cuba.202 A clandestine CIA operation trained recent Cuban 
immigrants to overthrow the Castro regime.203 Kennedy was hesitant to use U.S. military 
troops or air strikes to openly support the effort, and the Bay of Pigs operation was easily 
defeated by the Cuban military in April of 1961.204 Kennedy’s failure during the Bay of 
Pigs was viewed by Cuban exiles in the United States as a complete fiasco and a betrayal 
by the U.S. Democratic Party that would be remembered for years to come.205 On 
September 4, 1961, President Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public 
Law 87–195), which contained a specific prohibition against providing any assistance to 
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Cuba and a ban on all trade with Cuba until it adopted a democratically elected 
government.206 
In the meantime, Cuba continued to receive military support from the Soviet 
Union, and U.S. intelligence reports showed that the Cubans were building structures to 
support nuclear weapons.207 The U.S. government worried of a possible aggressive 
Soviet military action against the United States by leveraging the strategic location and 
close proximity of the Caribbean island nation. This threat would culminate in the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. As Harvard researcher and author Graham Allison explained, “For thirteen 
days of October 1962, there was a higher probability that more human lives would end 
suddenly than ever before in history.”208 The United States had never been so close to 
nuclear attack. After ruling out air strikes, President Kennedy sent a U.S. Navy fleet to 
“quarantine” Cuba. Through a careful twist of diplomatic wording, the quarantine was 
not considered an international act of war.209 This strategic decision ensured that the 
United States did not officially instigate war with Cuba, but prevented the Soviet nuclear 
weapons from being transported to Cuba by sea. The U.S. Navy ensured that the 
quarantine worked and the nuclear threat never escalated.210 The Cuban Missile Crisis 
was a major success for the United States, and an embarrassment for the Soviet Union 
and Cuba.  
In the wake of the Cuban Revolution and Cuban Missile Crisis, thousands of 
Cuban nationals escaped to the open waters of the Caribbean Sea and set sail to find 
political refuge and freedom in the United States (see Figure 4 for a map of Cuba; the 
United States is represented by the southern tip of Florida).211 Cubans immediately began 
to overwhelm the existing U.S. immigration system and, in 1966, Congress passed an 
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unprecedented policy to help Cuban nationals permanently escape the communist regime. 
The law that was passed became known as the Cuban Adjustment Act.212 
Figure 4.  Map of Cuba 
 
Source: “Administrative Map of Cuba,” Nations Online, accessed November 16, 2015, 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/cuba-administrative-map.htm. 
B. FICTIONAL SCENARIO 
The phone rang. Manuel got up from the couch to answer it in the kitchen. His 
brother, Juan, called every Thursday night around the same time.  
“Alo, buenas?” Manuel’s standard telephone greeting. 
“Hermano! You’re not going to believe this…” It was his brother, right on cue. 
Manuel let out a long exhale, “Now what?” he thought. Juan was always excited 
about something, but it was usually for nothing. 
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It had been more than 10 years since Juan lived with them in Havana, and 
Manuel could count on one hand the number of times Juan had ever sent money to their 
mother. Manuel expected that Juan would have visited at some point, like so many of the 
Cubans who lived in Miami, but Juan never returned to the island. Juan said he didn’t 
have enough money, but Manuel knew it was an excuse. Even still, their mother never 
stopped asking when Juan would return. 
Manuel lived in a small, two-bedroom apartment with his wife, two children, and 
his mother. The apartment was on the second floor above a basic food store, four blocks 
down from the popular seaside Malecon boulevard in Havana. It was a great location 
and they had lived there ever since Manuel could remember. Manuel, Juan, and their 
sister Cristina were the only siblings. Juan and Cristina were both in Miami now, but 
Manuel had stayed behind, mostly to take care of their mother. Mami said she would 
never leave her island, revolution or no. Fidel may have taken her finca (farm), but he 
could never take her homeland. And so Manuel stayed. Manuel had taught high school 
for twenty years now. It was a good job and teachers received help from their students’ 
families during the food shortages.213 He could not complain. 
“Cuéntame, hermano. What is the news?” Manuel tried to sound excited, but he 
wasn’t. Juan continued, “Man, you are not going to believe this, Manuel, but you won! 
You won el bombo (the lottery)!”214 
“What are you talking about? Is this some kind of joke?” 
“Nah, man. This is no joke! I told you last fall I was applying for you and Mary 
Carmen and the kids. Remember I sent you all those forms to sign? Well, I have been 
checking the status of the application on the computer. I just looked this evening and sure 
enough, you won! You can get visas and bring the whole family to Miami!” 
The information began to sink in. Manuel remembered the paperwork—it had 
arrived in a fancy shipment envelope all the way from Miami. Juan had event sent money 
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for the return postage. Manuel had figured it was just another of Juan’s crazy ideas that 
wouldn’t go anywhere. 
“I...I don’t know what to say. Are you sure?” 
“Of course I am sure. Now you have to go to the American Embassy and get your 
visas.215 I will send you all the papers you need to show them. You have to hurry because 
there’s a time limit.”216 
Manuel was not so sure. He did not trust the Americans, and he didn’t trust 
Juan’s judgment, or his information. Besides, what about their mother? He couldn’t just 
leave her behind on the island. She was getting older now, and he often had to barter and 
trade just to get the medication she needed for her arthritis.  
It was almost as though Juan read his mind. 
“Hey, don’t worry about Mom, either,” he said, softer. “There’s a new way I can 
apply for her to come directly to Miami. I’ll take care of everything.” 
It was hard for Manuel not to doubt his brother. Juan had defected from Cuba 
and hadn’t returned to see them in over ten years. Juan had forgotten how difficult it was 
to live on the island. The apartment needed constant repairs, but Manuel could never find 
all the materials he needed. If anyone got sick, the medical care was free, but the 
hospitals never had enough supplies. Manuel had grown tired of the food shortages, the 
government controlled radio and television, and the watchful police. He knew he was not 
free. The children received a good education, but there was little future on the island. 
Manuel and Mary Carmen had talked before about wanting to leave, but Manuel could 
not leave their mother behind. Their mother would not leave Cuba without a fight, and 
Juan would never understand her loyalty—or anyone else’s—to the island. 
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“Wow,” Manuel said after a pause. “Well…let me discuss things with Mary 
Carmen. I will put Mom on the phone so you can say hi, but don’t say anything to her yet 
about Miami. Call us again over the weekend.” 
C. IMMIGRATION OPTIONS 
1. Diversity Lottery Visa Program, El Bombo 
Cubans can apply for U.S. visa consideration under the Department of State’s 
Diversity Visa Lottery Program. In Cuba, this program is commonly known as el 
bombo.217 The Diversity Visa Lottery Program is meant to encourage immigration from 
historically under-represented countries.218 Countries that already experience strong 
trends of immigration to the United States do not qualify for consideration in the 
Diversity Lottery Visa Program. The program’s 2017 instructions show that foreign 
nationals from the following countries are ineligible to apply:  
Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China (mainland-born), Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, United Kingdom 
(except Northern Ireland) and its dependent territories, and Vietnam. 
Persons born in Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, and Taiwan are 
eligible.219  
These countries are excluded because each already receives more than 50,000 immigrant 
visas in a year. Foreign nationals from all other countries are eligible to apply. The total 
annual diversity visa limit for all countries has been 50,000 annually since 1999, but a 
different numbers of visas are allocated for each of the different countries.220  
In 2015, the automated bombo system ultimately allocated 1,480 diversity lottery 
visas to Cuban nationals. To compare Cuba with the other countries in this research: 
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Hondurans received 165 lottery visas and Syrians received 598 the same year.221 A total 
of 14,418,063 lottery entries were received for the program, with the following number of 
entries received for the countries of interest: 
• Honduras: FY 15 = 9,610 
• Cuba: FY 15 = 112,998 
• Syria: FY 15 = 50,659222 
The program operates as a joint responsibility between the U.S. Department of State and 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. To enter the Diversity Visa Lottery Program, 
applicants must register within a certain time period, be a native from an eligible country 
(or qualify through a spouse or parents), and meet the education requirement of a high 
school diploma (or equivalent) or the work experience requirement of two years in a job 
category that requires specific training as defined by the U.S. Department of Labor.223 
… 
Mary Carmen and Manuel went for a walk after dinner out on El Malecon. These 
walks happened whenever there was something important to discuss that warranted 
privacy. It was never a great idea to openly discuss plans to leave Cuba, even if there 
was a visa waiting at the embassy. Mary Carmen was more excited than Manuel, but they 
were both apprehensive. All of Mary Carmen’s family was still in Cuba, and there was 
the sensitive matter of Manuel’s mother to consider. His mother had been disenchanted 
with the United States ever since Juan’s decision to live there permanently. Juan had 
made it through medical school and become a doctor in Cuba. Their mother was so 
proud to say they had a doctor in the family. Juan was personally selected by the Cuban 
government to participate in the Cuban foreign medical brigade. This was a great honor 
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and it meant that Juan was given a passport and exit permission to leave Cuba. Juan 
travelled to Bolivia for two years, providing medical assistance to the poor.  
Manuel had felt something was wrong the day Juan left. Their goodbyes were a 
little longer than needed. Juan got incredibly emotional, but Manuel assumed it was the 
good Cuban rum and cigars they had been enjoying at the going away party. That was 
2002. That was the last time they had seen Juan. Manuel had no idea how he had gotten 
to Miami, but three years later, Juan called Manuel from the United States and said he 
was not coming back to Cuba. He had found a way out. 
2. Cuban Medical Professional Parole Program 
Juan was able to take advantage of a unique humanitarian parole program offered 
exclusively to Cuban medical doctors. As discussed in the previous chapter on Honduras, 
Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act grants humanitarian parole 
authority to authorize anyone from any country to enter the United States for 
humanitarian reasons or for a significant public benefit.224 The U.S. government 
organized two programs specifically for Cuba under this parole authority: the Cuban 
Medical Professional Parole Program and the Cuban Family Reunification Program. 
These programs are two organized responses of U.S. immigration policy that create 
specific ways to aid Cuban applicants who want to come to the United States. The Cuban 
Medical Professional Parole Program began on August 11, 2006, when the departments 
of Homeland Security and State announced that they would provide Cuban medical 
personnel working or studying in a third country an avenue to legally enter the United 
States.225  
Cuba has a robust state-sponsored medical program and routinely sends medical 
brigades to assist in other countries, as seen in the Cuban response to the Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa.226 The Cuban Medical Professional Parole program allows well-trained 
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Cuban medical personnel to easily defect from Cuba by presenting themselves at any 
U.S. Embassy or Consulate abroad.227 No other country can access the legal U.S. 
immigration system through this program. In 2014, the United States granted 1,289 visas 
to Cuban medical professionals.228  
When the Cuban government sent Juan to Bolivia, Juan was able to present 
himself at the U.S. Embassy in La Paz and apply for a parole document to travel directly 
to the United States. After one year of being in the United States, Juan could apply for 
Lawful Permanent Residence under the Cuban Adjustment Act. 
… 
A few months after Juan made it to Miami, their sister, Cristina, who had worked 
in Cayo Guillermo at an international tourist hotel, left the island to join Juan.229 
Cristina never said anything to Manuel or the family in Havana. Although it was taboo to 
talk about plans to leave the island, Manuel thought she would have mentioned 
something. Once again, Manuel was left to pick up the pieces when their mother refused 
to get out of bed for two weeks after Cristina’s departure. Cristina knew that all she had 
to do was get to the United States. If she could get to land, to American soil, and not be 
found first by the American oficiales, she could get her papers. Every Cuban knew 
that.230 
Cristina called Juan in the United States and explained she had found someone in 
Cayo Guillermo who could help her get out of Cuba. Juan knew Cristina would have to 
save for years to afford the smuggler’s fee, or risk being indebted to Cuba’s elaborate 
crime network. Juan offered to send the payment directly. He’d rather owe a friend or 
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even sell his car in Miami so Cristina would not owe the smugglers.231 And so Juan sent 
$10,000 to Cuba in separate installments over the next few months.  
Cristina left La Isabela, Cuba, in the dead of night on a boat operated by two 
smugglers (see Figure 5). Cristina nervously counted around 35 other people on board: 
men, women, and even children. The plan was for this boat to take them somewhere in 
the Bahamas, where they would transfer to a different vessel that would take them to the 
Florida Keys. Juan was supposed to wait for Cristina at a small hotel outside the marina 
in Florida. Cristina whispered a quiet Hail Mary under her breath and boarded the 
boat.232 
Figure 5. Cuban Refugees at Sea 
 
A boatload of Cuban refugees hopes to avoid detection by the U.S. Coast Guard and arrive safely in the 
United States. Source: UNHCR, accessed March 12, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/thumb1/49fafac10.jpg. 
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3. Cuban Adjustment Act 
The Cuban Adjustment Act was a single piece of legislation enacted by the 89th 
United States Congress and signed into law by President Lyndon Johnson on November 
2, 1966.233 The law allows any Cuban national to become a Lawful Permanent Resident 
under their own immigrant visa category after being inspected or paroled and physically 
present in the United States for two years (reduced to one year by the Immigration and 
Nationality Act Amendments of 1976).234 There is no limit on the number of Cubans 
who can apply and qualify. For this reason, Cuban nationals do not need to rely on the 
U.S. Asylum Program. The year 2016 marks the 50th anniversary of the Cuban 
Adjustment Act.235 Since its inception in 1966, the Act has seen some minor revisions, 
but for the most part it has remained intact. Cuba currently has around 11 million 
inhabitants, close to the current populations of Illinois or Ohio.236 Though it is a 
relatively small country, Cubans were the sixth-largest group of new Lawful Permanent 
Residents in the United States from 2011 to 2013.237  
Cuban nationals who seek Lawful Permanent Residence under the Cuban 
Adjustment Act are not subject to many of the rules that other lawful immigrants must 
follow.238 Cubans do not have to enter the United States at an official port of entry. They 
do not have to wait for an allocated visa to become available to them, nor do they have to 
show that they have sufficient financial support.239 Cubans only need to prove that they 
are Cuban and physically present in the United States in order to qualify for Lawful 
Permanent Residence under the Cuban Adjustment Act. It is a law that is unparalleled in 
the immigration laws of the United States. Nevertheless, Cuban nationals who are 
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physically present in Cuba can still apply for consideration under the U.S. Refugee 
Program. (The U.S. Refugee Program is discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.) 
… 
Once Juan established himself in Miami, he called Manuel every week and asked 
when the rest of the family would join him. But Manuel knew the journey was far too 
dangerous. He had young children, and their mother was already using a cane. There 
was no way they could handle the journey in a “go-fast” boat or yola in the open ocean. 
Besides, not everyone even made it to Florida. They could be intercepted by American 
officials, or worse. Manuel had heard stories of people left for dead on desert islands 
somewhere in the Caribbean.240 Juan was not thinking of all these things. Juan had it 
easy. He left Cuba on an airplane just like all the tourists. Besides, Manuel had a decent 
job in Cuba. And Juan wasn’t even working as a medical doctor in Miami—he said the 
exams were too difficult to become a doctor in the United States. Their mother still did 
not know that Juan was no longer a doctor and that he worked, instead, in construction 
and painting outside Fort Lauderdale. Their mother would have been devastated. 
After the news of the visa lottery and a few evening walks on El Malecon to talk 
things over, Manuel and Mary Carmen decided that it would be best to reunite the entire 
family in Florida, with one important condition. Juan would have to return to Havana to 
explain the plan to their mother. Manuel knew that the bombo visa had to be used within 
a certain timeframe, and he would not leave their mother by herself in Cuba. Juan could 
stay for a few months while the final paperwork was completed.  
Manuel spoke to Juan on the phone that following Thursday evening. Juan would 
not agree to return to Cuba.  
“Hermano, you do not understand,” said Juan, “I am not like the Cubans who fly 
back and forth for the holidays. The Cuban government issued me a passport to go to 
Bolivia. I defected from the medical program. They would throw me in jail as soon as I 
set foot on the island. I cannot come back, and I cannot get another Cuban passport.” 




“Bueno…” said Manuel. He could see this conversation was going nowhere, and 
his brother just might be right this time. “What about Cristina, then?” Cristina had 
gotten her green card. She worked for a cleaning service in Miami, making good 
money, and even talked about applying for American citizenship once she improved her 
English. The brothers agreed that Cristina would have to be the one to return to Cuba 
and bring their mother to Florida. 
4. Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program
Under the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, Cubans who make it to 
the United States and become Lawful Permanent Residents can apply for a “fast track” 
for family members back in Cuba. All Lawful Permanent Residents, Cuban or otherwise, 
have the right to petition for a spouse or child.241 The problem is that family members 
abroad often have to wait years before a visa is available for them because of numerical 
limitations in these categories.242 Sections 201–203 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act outline the system in place that controls the number of family-based and 
employment-based immigrants allowed to enter the country.243 These numbers are 
calculated from one month to the next, and are announced through the Department of 
State’s monthly Visa Bulletin.244 Under the numerical system, most Lawful Permanent 
Residents must wait approximately two years to apply for their foreign-born spouse or 
child.245 Under the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, family members of 
Cubans in the United States have a quicker process to come to the United States.246  
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The Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program began on November 21, 2007, 
and continues to strive to issue a minimum of 20,000 travel documents each year for 
Cuban family members in Havana.247 This is the program Juan plans to use to petition for 
his mother to come to the United States. The Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program 
would allow his mother expeditious processing without having to make a treacherous 
journey to the United States or otherwise circumvent immigration laws. Once inside the 
United States, his mother would be given access to immediate public assistance through 
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Cuban–Haitian Entrant Program. This 
program matches new Cuban refugees with the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services to help the Cuban immigrants apply for all needed services. Cuban parolees are 
given access to all basic necessities such as housing, a food allowance, social security, 
public schools, employment training, and medical care.248 
… 
Cristina agreed to return to Cuba to pick up their mother. The whole family got 
dressed up and waited for Cristina with excitement at the José Martí International 
Airport in Havana. They hadn’t seen Cristina in six years, and it was the first time they 
had ever picked up a family member from the airport. The children, and even Manuel and 
Mary Carmen, were impressed with how many travelers, taxis, and pieces of luggage 
moved quickly through the corridor. They waited in a large area beyond the security 
checkpoint where everyone lined up to watch for arriving passengers. Manuel made sure 
that they were plenty early. Their mother insisted. Their mother had spent all night 
preparing Cristina’s favorite tamales and was up again at 4:00 a.m. to get ready for the 
trip to the airport. His mother now refused to sit to wait for Cristina. She stood at the 
front of the crowd with her imposing short stature and cane in hand. A sorrow had rested 
in her heart ever since Juan and then Cristina left the island. She had waited years for 
this moment. 
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“Mami?!” Cristina appeared and hugged her mother tightly.  
The whole family gathered around. Even Manuel had to fight back the tears. 
Their mother could not believe this beautiful woman standing in front of them was her 
Cristina, all grown up. There were so many things to say. Cristina could not believe how 
much older everyone looked. She had been gone too long.  
Cristina ate like a queen and enjoyed conversations and music well into the night. 
The plan was for Cristina to stay for a couple of weeks and later return to Cuba once 
Manuel and Mary Carmen were ready to permanently leave the island. Cristina would 
then remain in Cuba with their mother until their mother’s entry paperwork was ready to 
go. The problem was that Cristina was only a Lawful Permanent Resident in the United 
States, and therefore subject to residency requirements. Any departure over six months 
could jeopardize Cristina’s lawful status.249 They hoped they would all reunite in Miami 
within the year. 
Two nights later, Manuel and Cristina walked with their mother to El Malecon. 
They told her they had something important to discuss. Upon hearing the plan for the 
whole family to move to Miami, their mother looked away from Manuel and Cristina. 
Tears welled up in her eyes. When her gaze returned, she announced they were both 
crazy. She was born in Cuba, she said. She lived her whole life in Cuba, and she would 
die in Cuba. She got up, tapped her cane on the sidewalk, and continued walking along 
El Malecon, back toward the house.  
D. SECURITY CONCERNS 
When the United States severed all diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1961, the 
president of the United States did not meet again with a Cuban head of state until 
2015.250 On July 1, 2015, President Obama announced that the United States would re-
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establish formal diplomatic relations with Cuba, effective July 20, 2015.251 Politics are at 
the heart of the strained relationship between Cuba and the United States. The main 
source of conflict between the two countries is not that Cuba directly threatens the United 
States, but rather that “these two nations view the world in diametrically opposed terms, 
that the values that each seeks to vindicate through its foreign policy make them natural 
antagonists, and that a permanent rivalry is built into their behavior … It is, in short, a 
struggle that revolves around ideas, beliefs, and values as much as will and 
capabilities.”252 The extreme stance and lack of diplomatic communication between the 
two nations had negative repercussions for the “democracy-promotion” efforts of U.S. 
foreign policy. The Cuban Democracy Act that established the economic embargo 
prohibits a long-term solution unless the Cuban government becomes completely 
democratic in a manner that mirrors the democracy in the United States.253  
The movement made by the U.S. government to re-establish relations with the 
Cuban government has met grave concern and genuine outrage in Cuban-American 
exiles.254 Many politicians, such as Florida Senator and Presidential Candidate Marco 
Rubio, do not support President Obama’s steps to normalize relations.255 Meanwhile, 
small steps toward a freer society continue to emerge for the people of Cuba. The 
government of Cuba announced in 2012 that Cuban citizens would no longer require exit 
permission to leave the country.256 A modification to the unique U.S. immigration 
policies for Cuba will require an act of Congress. Cuban refugees have access to five 
different humanitarian immigration programs, three of which are exclusively available to 
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Cuban nationals.257 U.S. humanitarian immigration policies for Cuba must be 
incorporated into a larger strategy. American values promote humanitarian assistance for 
the world’s vulnerable populations, but the exceptionalism granted to the Cuban 
migration crisis may no longer be justified. 
E. CONCLUSION 
U.S. foreign policy strategy post-1950 was dominated by a theory that the 
establishment of socialist governments would lead to a “domino effect” of increased 
communist support. When the Cuban revolution showed increasingly communist 
tendencies, the United States ended its diplomatic relationship with the country and saw 
massive numbers of immigrants seek refuge in the United States. The Cuban Adjustment 
Act is a completely unique humanitarian immigration reform developed in response to a 
massive influx of Cuban immigrants. The law allows for much more relaxed standards 
and requirements for Cuban immigrants to remain permanently in the United States. 
Today, the Cuban Adjustment Act is one avenue among several humanitarian 
immigration options open to Cuban nationals. Cubans can qualify under the U.S. Refugee 
Program, under the Diversity Lottery Visa Program, and under the Medical Parole and 
Family Reunification Parole programs.  
In 2014, U.S.-Cuban relations began to change, supporting a gradual opening of 
government institutions and freedoms for its citizens. The immigration policies in place 
for Cuban refugees are no longer timely, and send a message of exceptionalism to the rest 
of the world that is incongruent with other U.S. immigration laws and values. The United 
States could continue to process all Cuban nationals with humanitarian need under the 
existing U.S. Refugee and Asylum programs without the need for the Cuban Adjustment 
Act. 
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IV. CASE STUDY: SYRIA 
A. COUNTRY CONTEXT 
The ongoing conflict in Syria has resulted in the largest humanitarian migration 
movement since World War II.258 Syrian refugees are escaping an ongoing civil war and 
the spread of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The dangers are culturally, 
ethnically, and politically motivated, as individuals flee from multiple conflicts in war-
torn chaos. Reports explain that within the Syrian conflict there is little differentiation 
between military and civilian forces, with violence on all sides. This crisis has triggered 
the forced exodus of more than 4 million refugees as of July 2015.259 Another 7.6 million 
Syrian people are internally displaced.260 Thousands of Syrian refugees have flooded into 
Europe. Each nation has the autonomy to determine which refugees it will accept; “In 
crude summary, the international law of refugees says, ‘let those people go’; ‘don’t send 
them back to where they came from’; but it does not say ‘take those people in.’”261 The 
United States was slow to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis, but ultimately agreed to 
accept up to 10,000 Syrian refugees in 2016.262 All Syrian nationals considered for 
refugee status in the United States must pass security checks, as determined by the U.S. 
government. Very few Syrian refugees have actually made it through the U.S. Refugee 
Resettlement Program.  
In the meantime, Syrian nationals who are already present in the United States 
remain in a limbo immigration status, sometimes for years, while a request for asylum is 
                                                 
258 “EU Says World Facing Worst Refugee Crisis since WWII,” UNHCR, last modified August 16, 
2015, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass=52fc6fbd5&id=55d17e7b5. 
259 “UNHCR: Total Number of Syrian Refugees Exceeds Four Million for First Time,” UNHCR, July 
9, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/559d67d46.html. 
260 “UNHCR: Total Number of Syrian Refugees,” UNHCR. 
261 Carl Kaysen, Threatened Peoples Threatened Borders, ed. Michael Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner 
(New York: Norton, 1995), 246. 
262 Gardiner Harris, David E. Sanger, and David M. Herszenhorn, “Obama Increases Number of 
Syrian Refugees for U.S. Resettlement to 10,000,” New York Times, September 10, 2015. 
 76 
processed.263 On January 5, 2015, Jeh Johnson announced that Syrian nationals were 
eligible to renew Temporary Protected Status.264 But Temporary Protected Status does 
not lead to a permanent immigration solution.265 The U.S. response to the Syrian 
population’s needs has been slow, cumbersome, and insufficient. This global migratory 
event has raised public and political concern about whether or not the United States is 
adequately addressing vulnerable populations in a manner that upholds the historical 
ideals of our country while ensuring the safety of the American people.   
The emergent migratory situation in Syria is relatively recent, but the need is 
extreme. Of the 4 million Syrian refugees living in nearby countries, more than half are 
children.266 Syrian unaccompanied minors are migrating as far as Greece to seek safety 
and opportunity in the European Union.267 The now-famous photo of Aylan Kurdi (see 
Figure 5), the three-year-old Syrian refugee whose body was found washed up on a 
Turkish beach, drew international attention to the profound desperation of this crisis.268 
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Figure 5.  Syrian Refugee, 3-Year-Old Aylan Kurdi, Deceased on a Turkish 
Beach 
 
The accidental death of Aylan Kurdi, a young Syrian refugee fleeing on an overcrowded boat, prompted 
international concern over the plight of the Syrian population. Source: “Ayla Kurdi Baby Photo World 
Press Photos of the Island,” Dogan News Agency, January 24, 2016, http://www.dha.com.tr/-aylan-kurdi-
bebek-fotografi-world-press-photosa-aday_1120851.html. 
In 2014, the UNHCR referred more than 12,000 refugee applicants for 
consideration in the U.S. Refugee Program. Of these, the United States initially accepted 
less than 1,000, citing difficulty performing adequate background checks.269 The small 
numerical commitment from the United States came under much scrutiny by international 
aid organizations. David Miliband, president of a major refugee assistance organization, 
publicly said that the United States should commit to accepting at least 65,000 Syrian 
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refugees.270 This request was supported by Illinois Senator Dick Durbin and other 
members of Congress in a letter to the President.271 In September of 2015, President 
Obama ultimately committed the United States to accepting 10,000 Syrian refugees in 
2016.272  
The U.S. Refugee Program is bound by annual numerical quotas. The current 
Congressional allotment for total refugees admitted for one year is 70,000.273 In 2015, 
the United States tried to accept between 1,000 and 2,000 Syrian refugees.274 These 
numbers are nowhere close to the estimates suggested by international relief 
organizations. The U.S. Department of State’s 2013 refugee statistics showed the 
following numbers of admitted refugees from the countries of interest to this study: 
• Hondurans (or any country in Central America) = 0  
• Cubans = 4,205 
• Syrians = 36275  
These numbers do not reflect the humanitarian urgency that exists in these countries. 
Whether the numbers reflect the national values of the United States is debated by the 
public, non-profit organizations, the media, and elected officials. 
While the world decides whether or not to accept Syrian refugees for resettlement, 
the problems in Syria continue. There has always been a strong oppositional force against 
the government in Syria. The group is composed primarily of Sunni Muslims who seek to 
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end the Assad regime in favor of a democratically elected government.276 The Assad 
regime has been unwilling to relinquish power or engage in serious dialogue with the 
opposition; instead, it used—and still uses—military and security forces to maintain its 
control of the population.277 In doing so, the Assad regime lost international support, 
particularly from Turkey and the United States. Russia and China remain strong allies of 
Syria and the Assad regime.278  
B. FICTIONAL SCENARIO  
Hayat helped her mother divide up the bread as best she could and arranged the 
rough pieces neatly on a tin plate. Her mother had said everything would be better in 
Lebanon, but Hayat was still waiting to see their lives improve. For one thing, they didn’t 
have an apartment with stairs and a regular roof like in Syria. They had a large white 
tent that made a lot of noise when it was windy (see Figure 6).279 Hayat’s new school was 
crowded. Hayat could understand the things her teacher said, but it was not as fun as her 
old school because they did not have the same colorful papers and pencils. Hayat was 
placed in year four because that is where all the nine- and ten-year-olds were placed, but 
Hayat knew she should be in year five. Hayat had completed all her studies in year four 
back in Syria and found the current lessons boring. At least she could play outside with 
the other kids. There were always friends close by, even though her mother did not let her 
go very far.  
Hayat looked over at her younger brother moving a small toy car across the 
cement block in front of their tent. A lot of the other boys around were jealous of his toy 
car. Hayat was happy she remembered to bring it when they left Syria. Her brother was 
still sad about leaving their grandparents, their dog, and everything else back home. But 
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Hayat knew better than to be sad now. She knew they might not be able to go back to 
Syria for a long, long time. 
Figure 6.  Syrian Refugee in Marj, Lebanon 
 
A Syrian refugee family awaits an uncertain future at the UNHCR refugee camp in Marj, Lebanon. Source: 
Jamie Dettmer, “UN Presses Lebanon to Open Syrian Refugee Camps,” Voice of America, June 18. 2014, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/un-presses-lebanon-to-open-syrian-refugee-camps/1684189.html. 
C. REFUGEE STATISTICS 
Neighboring Turkey and Lebanon have absorbed the majority of Syrian refugees 
(see Figure 7). Current reports from the UNHCR state that, as of December 31, 2015, 
there were 1,069,111 Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon, making refugees roughly 
one-fifth of the country’s total population.280 Although Lebanon is not party to the 1951 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Syrians in Lebanon have been 
accepted as refugees. The Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs is the official government 
agency responsible for coordinating the emergency response to this humanitarian crisis 
with the help of the UNHCR.281 There are a high percentage of women and children 
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Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The UN has tried to make special arrangements to address 
the unique needs of this population.282 
Figure 7.  Syrian Refugee Map 
 





                                                 




Hayat walked outside the tent and watered the tiny seeds she had brought from 
Syria. The small bottle was propped up in the dirt next to their tent. Her grandmother 
gave her the seeds right before they left: “So you will always be able to grow roots,” she 
said.  
Hayat was very sad to leave her grandparents in Syria. A few days after Hayat, 
her mother, and her brother arrived in the massive tent city, Hayat found an old bottle 
lying on the ground. She filled it with dirt and softly covered two of the seeds. She 
checked on her seed bottle every day but had yet to find signs of life. 
In Syria, after her father disappeared, Hayat knew that they were not safe 
anymore. They had lived on the outskirts of Latakia. Hayat and her brother hid in a 
closet every time they heard a missile or explosion in the distance, which was often.283 
Their father had worked at the big university there called Tishreen, and their 
grandparents owned the bakery down the street from their apartment.284 Their mother 
often helped in the bakery, and Hayat and her brother knew they could always go there 
for a tasty treat. Their grandparents stayed on the family’s small farm outside Latakia, 
but later they moved into town because of all the fighting in the mountains.285  
Hayat remembered one of their last nights in the apartment. She had asked her 
father why there was so much fighting. Her father looked tired. He slowly explained that 
Syria was locked in a type of cage, and many different people were fighting to find the 
key. Hayat smiled at this, thinking of so many grownup men fighting to find a simple key. 
Her father had kissed her goodnight. She heard him light a cigarette and go down the 
stairs and out the back. He never returned home.  
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Two months later, Hayat waited with her brother and her mother in a long line to 
register as refugees in Lebanon. They were assigned a white tent, given a few food 
supplies, a tin plate, two cups, and three blankets. Mother said they would only stay a few 
weeks, until something better could be found. That was three months ago. 
D. IMMIGRATION OPTIONS 
1. U.S. Refugee Program 
In 1951, delegates from 26 different countries established the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.286 Article 1(A)(2) of the convention 
document defines a refugee as someone who has a “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”287 Based on the ideas adopted by the United States during the 
1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, qualifying forced migrants 
cannot be returned to their countries of origin.288 Erika Feller, UN Assistant High 
Commissioner for Protection of Refugees, explains that this founding document is still 
“the wall behind which refugees can shelter,” and that “it is the best we have, at the 
international level, to temper the behavior of states.”289 The U.S. Refugee Program seeks 
to find and assist the most vulnerable populations of the world, while furthering U.S. 
foreign policy. 
… 
Hayat’s father had worked as a university professor in Syria. He spoke French, 
Arabic, and English and was educated in Europe. He still held a valid visa to travel in 
Europe and the United States because of his long-time employment with the university 
and his scholarship abroad. Hayat’s father had been closely monitored by the university 
for anti-government or oppositional tendencies. Enormous photos of the Assad rulers 
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hung atop the main university building to remind everyone where their allegiance should 
lie (see Figure 8).290 
Figure 8.  Assad Regime Rulers’ Photos Displayed atop Tishreen 
University’s Main Building in Latakia, Syria 
 
Source: “Tishreen University,” accessed December 9, 2015, http://www.tishreen.edu.sy. 
Hayat’s father was a very smart man and knew how to play the system. He did 
what he needed to do to keep his job at the university, but many friends with whom he 
had grown up had disappeared either in government arrests or fighting with the 
opposition. Hayat’s father kept his distance, but every day the fighting moved closer to 
Latakia (see Figure 9). As the violence worsened, he knew his family could not stay. But 
there was no way they could obtain the visas or authorization to leave Syria now. Hayat’s 
father arranged to travel to Turkey, with the help of friends. From there he would try to 
reach Europe or the United States. He could not say anything to anyone, not even his 
own wife. She was safer if she knew nothing. He would send for Hayat and the rest of the 
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Figure 9.  Map of Syria Conflict 
 
Source: “Syria: Mapping the Conflict” BBC, July 10, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-22798391 
2. Temporary Protected Status 
On March 29, 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security designated Syria as an 
eligible country for Temporary Protected Status due to “extraordinary and temporary 
conditions.”291 Hayat’s father will be able to benefit from Temporary Protected Status 
offered to Syrians already present in the United States. The designation was re-
announced in 2015, at which point any Syrian who was present in the United States from 
June 17, 2013 to January 5, 2015 could qualify.292 Despite the extended open application 
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period, only half of all Syrians present in the United States have registered with the 
program—there are approximately 5,000 Syrians registered for Temporary Protected 
Status, of a potential 10,000.293 Reports suggest a possible lack of trust in the 
government system or the continued hope of returning to Syria as possible reasons for the 
low registration numbers.294  
… 
It was a long and complicated journey, but when he arrived in the United States, 
Hayat’s father met up with an old friend he knew from their college days in France. The 
friend told him about the Temporary Protected Status program for Syrians stuck in the 
United States. Although it had been several weeks since Hayat’s father left Syria, he 
immediately tried to call their house. He now had a plan to get the family at least as far 
as Europe. He had found a group of smugglers who could take each of them from Turkey 
to Greece for around $3,000 U.S. dollars.295 But the phone line at the house was 
disconnected. He tried his wife’s cell phone, but got nothing. Finally, Hayat’s father was 
able to contact his parents at the bakery. His mother cried when she heard her son’s 
voice. “Praise Allah!” she said over and over. His father got on the phone and explained 
how the family thought he had been killed or arrested by government agents. Hayat, her 
mother, and brother had no choice but to travel to Lebanon to seek refuge. They had 
received one phone call from Hayat’s mother to say she had made it safely to Lebanon. 
Nothing more was known. 
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Refugees are required to apply to immigrate to the United States while they are 
outside of the country.296 The U.S. Asylum Program is the sister program to the U.S. 
Refugee Program. The main difference between the two is that refugees are processed 
outside the United States, whereas asylum seekers are applicants who are already in the 
United States or requesting admission at a U.S. port of entry. Together, the U.S. Refugee 
Program and the U.S. Asylum Program are the only immigration programs available to 
meet the needs of all displaced persons fleeing persecution. There are no numerical 
limitations on the U.S. Asylum Program, but because each immigrant in the Refugee 
Program receives financial public assistance and other immediate benefits, the number of 
refugee slots is limited by annual appropriations from Congress.297 By August 2014, the 
United States received 2,500 Syrian referrals to the Refugee Program from the 
UNHCR.298 Referrals from the UNHCR are not guaranteed a slot in the U.S. Refugee 
Program but are presented to the United States for consideration. Of the 2,500 refugee 
cases presented to the United States by the UNHCR in 2014, the United States ultimately 
accepted 132 refugees from Syria.299   
The United States accepts specific allocations of refugees from all over the world 
based on the annual recommendations from the U.S. Department of State. In 2014, the 
United States accepted almost 70,000 refugees, only 132 of which were Syrian nationals. 
The proposed worldwide number for 2015 is also 70,000.300 The President of the United 
States has now agreed to allocate 10,000 slots (of the 70,000 total) to Syrian refugees in 
2016, but each applicant must be able to pass through the refugee vetting process. In 
addition, the presidential decision to try to accept more Syrian refugees has brought 
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unprecedented opposition from state governments, with the governors of 31 states 
declaring that Syrian refugees will not be welcome in their states (see Figure 10).301 State 
governments, however, do not directly govern the U.S. Refugee Program.  
In the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks, French President Francois Hollande 
committed to accepting another 30,000 Syrian refugees over the next two years. 
According to the Washington Post, President Hollande went on record as saying, “We 
have to reinforce our borders while remaining true to our values.”302 The United States is 
being criticized by the international relief organizations and partners in the European 
Union, who believe that the United States is flouting its values by accepting minimal 
numbers of Syrian refugees.303 
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Figure 10.  Where U.S. States Stand on Syrian Refugees 
Source: Hanna Sender, “Map: Every State Accepting and Refusing Syrian Refugees,” Newsweek, 
November 16, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/where-every-state-stands-accepting-or-refusing-syrian-
refugees-395050. 
… 
It had been one full year since Hayat, her mother, and her brother left Syria. The 
family had now moved out of the refugee camp and into the city. They lived in one room 
of a small makeshift house in Arsal with another Syrian family and a Lebanese family.304 
Hayat’s mother found work baking bread for a basic food shop down the street. Hayat 
and her brother were left in the house with the other families while their mother went to 
work for a few hours very early in the morning. She usually returned home around 
lunchtime.  
Hayat awoke one day, and her mother was already gone. She was glad her 
mother was not around because she had a big plan for the day. Hayat’s plant was now 
over 50 centimeters high, and she needed to find a new pot or bottle to cultivate it. 
304 “2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile - Lebanon,” UNHCR. 
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Hayat’s mother did not want the children playing outside when she was away, but Hayat 
mentally promised they would not go far. Hayat and her brother walked along the street 
where they lived looking through trash for a good pot.  
Hayat recalled the day they went to talk to the people from the United Nations. It 
was many months ago now. Her mother had made sure that everyone had clean clothing, 
a bath with hot water and soap, and a full stomach of rice porridge for the trip. With 
many other families, they were to see the workers from the refugee agency that were 
helping the United Nations to register Syrian nationals, hoping to be resettled in Europe 
or the United States. The agency workers set up a separate area outside the United 
Nations tent city. Hayat and her mother and brother waited for a very long time to be 
seen by the refugee agency representatives. There was a person who translated for them. 
They were all photographed, and Hayat’s mother was fingerprinted. Their mother was 
taken into another area while Hayat and her brother waited near the front. The area was 
separated by a small wall, but Hayat could still hear her mother’s voice. She was gone 
for a long time—Hayat listened carefully as her mother told the woman on the other side 
of the wall about their life back in Syria. When she came out, Hayat could tell her mother 
had been crying, but she did not look sad. She looked…relieved. It was the first time 
Hayat had seen hope in her mother’s eyes since they had come to Lebanon. Later that 
night, before bed, Hayat’s mother told her that things would be better very soon. Since 
Hayat’s father was no longer with them, they would receive special consideration from 
the refugee agency. Hayat knew that somehow, even though her father was not there, he 
was still looking out for them, wherever he was, and Hayat smiled as she drifted off to 
sleep. 
The dull shine of green plastic in the road caught Hayat’s eye. She could not 
believe her luck! A slightly dented two-liter bottle (the kind Hayat had seen at parties 
back in Syria) sat, discarded, along the side of the road near a fence. Hayat and her 
brother rushed across the street to collect the bottle. It was bent, but Hayat knew she 
could make it work. It was the perfect new home for her plant.  
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E. SECURITY CONCERNS 
There is no end in sight for the conflict in Syria. In the meantime, the UN 
estimates that over 13.5 million Syrians are displaced within Syria, beyond the 4.7 
million refugees that have fled to other countries.305 On December 18, 2015, the UN 
Security Council agreed on a plan and timetable to establish peace in Syria. The plan 
starts with closed-door talks between the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition 
leaders, though a date to begin has not been confirmed.306 There is hope that peace will 
come, but millions of displaced Syrians have already been forced out of a homeland 
ravaged by war and violence. 
The constant turbulence in the region caused by the Iraqi wars, and then the 
Syrian wars, allowed for a handful of radicalized young Muslims to find a stronghold and 
sympathizers ready to rally behind a new world order. Al Qaeda emerged from the 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the world’s most feared terrorist organization. 
As their radical ideology spread to Iraq and Syria, a new affiliated group took shape 
known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
shocked the world, and even Al Qaeda, with displays of unprecedented brutality.307 ISIS 
has established an advanced funding network and territorial claims that culminate in their 
version of a “true” Islamic caliphate.308 Foreign fighters from all over the globe have 
been attracted to the extreme rhetoric and warfare for Islam that ISIS promises. As the 
map in Figure 11 indicates, citizens from Europe, Africa, North America, and Australia 
have engaged in fighting with ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 
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Figure 11.  ISIS Foreign Fighters 
 
Source: “Foreign Fighters in Iraq & Syria: Where Do They Come from?” Radio Free Europe Radio 
Liberty, last modified March 11, 2016, http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-
iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html. 
Academics and international authorities are monitoring travel routes for ways to 
counter the plans of foreign ISIS sympathizers who seek to join the fight. A recent 
publication from the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political 
Violence (at King’s College in London) suggests current numbers of foreign fighters in 
Iraq and Syria exceed 20,000, a number that surpasses those seen during the conflict in 
Afghanistan.309 International ISIS recruits are citizens of all different countries, traveling 
with passports from all different countries. To confound the issue further, reports indicate 
that travelers to and from Syria have been encountered using fake passports and 
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intentionally unusual travel patterns. In November of 2015, Honduran police intercepted 
three Syrian nationals traveling from El Salvador, using fake Greek passports.310  
The explosive reach of ISIS has incited violent action outside of Iraq and Syria. 
Some of the terrorists who launched the horrific attack in Paris on November 13, 2015 
are believed to have been directly involved with ISIS.311 The terrorist attack in San 
Bernardino, California on December 2, 2015 may also have been inspired by a foreign 
terrorist organization.312 The same month, also in California, a college student in 
Sacramento plead guilty to federal charges of trying to provide material support to 
a terrorist organization after expressing interest in joining ISIS.313 Two Iraqi refugees 
were arrested in January of 2016, one in California who fought with ISIS, and one in 
Texas who expressed interest in joining ISIS.314 Both men were Palestinian and came 
to the United States as refugees. When one of the men was interviewed by U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services on October 6, 2014, he told the immigration 
officer that the he had no affiliation with any terrorist group and he had travelled to 
Turkey to visit family.315 This information was later used to aid prosecutors in 
making the arrest. Though this individual fought with ISIS and provided material 
support to the terrorist organization in Syria, “The prosecutor’s office in Texas said 
there was no imminent threat to public safety associated with Mr. Hardan’s 
arrest.”316 These men had been motivated to join the fighting in Syria, but it did not 
appear that the recruits had any intentions of planning a direct attack against the 
United States.  
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The international reach of ISIS continues to spark controversy over the refugee 
process in the United States. The State of Texas became the first to sue the Department of 
State and a non-profit refugee organization called the International Rescue Committee in 
December 2015 for failing to consult with the state prior to placing Syrian refugees.317 
The governor of Texas called on President Obama multiple times to stop refugee 
processing.318 In January of 2016, the governor of Alabama filed suit against the federal 
government over the matter of Syrian refugees.319 Both states cite a clause from the 
Refugee Act of 1980, in which the federal government is mandated to consult with states 
regarding refugee placement. This is the same law that established the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement under the federal Department of Health and Human Services.320 With the 
prevalence of online social networks to further their message, the reach of ISIS is 
spanning the globe. Citizens from every country are at risk of being recruited into the 
fight. The U.S. Department of Defense is engaged in ongoing airstrikes against ISIS in 
Iraq and Syria.321 In the meantime, Syrian refugees continue to seek a safe haven away 
from the war. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Syria is a country where a small minority has long ruled over the rest of the 
population, using force and oppression under the Assad regime. There is no functioning 
democratic system. The ongoing conflict in Syria has resurrected country coalitions that 
echo the same global tensions from the Cold War. The international fear is that the 
conflict in Syria will escalate to become another regional war in the Middle East. The 
U.S. response to the humanitarian migration crisis in Syria has been largely ineffective. 
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There was a period of Temporary Protected Status for Syrian nationals present in the 
United States, though program registration numbers are low. Overseas, the United States 
has accepted very few of the Syrian refugees presented for resettlement by the UNHCR. 
The Department of State launched ads through a public awareness campaign that seeks 
American support for refugees and counter the growing concerns over potential security 
issues within the refugee program (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12.  Department of State Syrian Refugee Ad 
 
Department of State public awareness campaign to gain greater American support of Syrian refugees. 
Source: “Syrian Refugee Response,” Department of State, accessed February 21, 2016, 
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/policyissues/issues/refugeeresponse/index.htm. 
The United States must maintain a response plan and rhetoric that is consistent 
with its value system as a nation welcoming of immigrants, particularly those who seek 
refuge. The country has much to gain from diplomatic messaging as a nation sympathetic 
to the major migratory crisis stemming from the Syrian conflict. In the meantime, the 
U.S. state governments that focus their attention on suing federal agencies over the 
refugee process fail to address the source of the security problem. ISIS looks to recruit 
members from all over the world: Australia, Europe, Canada, Syria, and the United 
States. ISIS is willing to exploit any migratory vulnerability it can find, well beyond the 
lengthy U.S. refugee process. Public and political insecurities surrounding ISIS 
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recruitment and covert foreign Syrian fighters must address the issue in its appropriate 
global context while remaining true to the positive values of the nation. 
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V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
The vetting procedures that exist within the U.S. Refugee Program are under close 
public scrutiny. Because of the Syrian refugee crisis and threats imposed by Syrian 
fighters and international terrorist groups such as ISIS, the public fears that humanitarian 
immigration programs may be placing the United States at an increased security risk. The 
world is more interconnected today through the Internet and advances in technology. 
Psychology Professor Fathali Moghaddam explains how “globalization and increased 
contact between different groups, particularly those with little previous history of living 
together, presents humankind with glorious opportunities but also confronts people with 
terrifying perils.”322 The sheer number of Syrian refugees who wish to resettle in 
Western nations pose a concern to the host nations. How many refugees can a country 
accept before its resources are diminished? There is additional concern about whether or 
not this new wave of Syrian refugees will be able to assimilate into Western cultures. Can 
Syrian refugees embrace Western values and ideals?  
A heightened fear of the background check and screening process for 
humanitarian immigration populations stems largely from the urgency of their “flight 
plight.” The chaotic situation in Syria results in an overall lack of available and/or 
accessible government institutions or sources for verification. The U.S. Refugee Program 
is under tremendous pressure to provide detailed explanations of the background check 
and refugee screening process because of public concern with this particular population.   
A. LEGAL IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
Background checks are performed at multiple points during an immigrant’s legal 
journey to the United States. On October 27, 2015, Leon Rodriguez, director of U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, explained to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, that “refugees are subject to 
the highest level of security checks, and a refugee applicant is not cleared for travel until 
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the results of all required security checks have been obtained and cleared.”323 
Background checks collect and store photographs, fingerprints, and biographic 
information on all foreign applicants who present themselves to the U.S. government for 
screening.324 The information is collected at multiple junctions and compared to existing 
databases maintained by multiple U.S. government agencies. Background checks look at 
areas such as previous visa requests and immigration history, travel history, criminal 
records, contact with military and intelligence agencies, and warrants of arrest. 
Technological advances in data storage and retrieval have allowed for information shared 
and collected by the U.S. government today to be more robust than at any other point in 
history.325  
Beyond the background check systems, there are application forms and in-person 
interviews conducted by international refugee organizations and government refugee 
officers employed by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.326 Both entities review 
all information on the application forms with the help of an independent translator; 
application information includes criminal history, travel history, marital status and 
children, ethnicity, employment history, foreign addresses, education, family 
relationships, and even military or paramilitary training. U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services uses Form I-590 for refugee processing. The form was officially 
updated in 2014 to include questions in a more consistent format.327  
The information on the form is self-reported by applicants, but all information is 
subject to further review and verification by the U.S. government. An applicant’s 
inability to provide all information or inconsistent information may result in the case 
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being held for further consideration or denied for insufficient evidence. An applicant’s 
willful failure to provide sufficient information or answer all questions truthfully will 
result in the denial of the case. The Immigration and Nationality Act states: “An alien 
who, by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, seeks to procure, has sought 
to procure, or has procured a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United 
States or other benefit provided under the Act, is inadmissible.”328 If an immigrant has 
already entered the country and is then found to have provided false information, he or 
she can be deported under the law.329  
Any applicant who is found to have been a member of a terrorist group, provided 
material support to a terrorist organization, or engaged in military-type training is denied 
under federal law. Section 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states: 
The grounds for inadmissibility include, but are not limited to, individuals who: 
• Engaged in “terrorist activity”; 
• Are engaged or are likely to engage in terrorist activity after entry; 
• Incited terrorist activity with intent to cause serious bodily harm or death; 
• Are representatives or current members of a terrorist organization; 
• Endorsed or espoused terrorist activity; 
• Received military-type training from or on behalf of a terrorist 
organization; or 
• Are spouses or children of anyone who has engaged in terrorist activity 
within the last five years (with certain exceptions).330 
Terrorist activity is defined as “various actions commonly associated with terrorism such 
as kidnapping, assassination, hijacking, nuclear, biological, or chemical agents, the use of 
firearms or other dangerous devices etc.”331 There is no special provision to differentiate 
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terrorists from freedom fighters. Any person who engages in this type of activity for the 
purpose of overthrowing a government regime, whether it is a democratic or authoritarian 
regime, is considered a terrorist under the U.S. definition.  
Although concern surrounding the screening of refugees through insufficient 
background checks is real, it is not new. Refugees always flee war-torn, chaotic, and 
violent situations. In most global conflicts, the United States has clear allies and enemies. 
The U.S. Refugee Program began as a global response to the massive human 
displacement caused by World War II. When thousands of European Jews sought refuge, 
the United States did not have an immediate response plan with adequate security 
measures. The U.S. Department of State was concerned that refugees admitted into the 
country could be working as spies for Germany.332 President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
allowed for a few thousand refugees to enter through one specially designed port of entry, 
but the refugees could only hail from non-occupied areas in Europe.333 Congress refused 
to modify the numerical immigration quotas, so at the end of 1945, after the war had 
ended, President Harry Truman issued an executive order to ensure that existing 
immigration quotas were used specifically for refugees. It was not until 1948 that 
Congress passed new legislation to allow for the entry of 400,000 refugees.334   
Even when country records are available, some government regimes cannot be 
trusted to produce accurate information, particularly of its persecuted populations. One 
year after the United States formally ended diplomatic relations with the new communist 
Cuban government, the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami had registered 155,000 
refugees.335 The United States accepted 125,000 Vietnamese refugees in the first years 
after South Vietnam was captured by the communist government of the north in 1975.336 
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The refugee process has adapted over the years to be able to provide a systematic review 
of each applicant in spite of the overwhelming unavailability of country records.337  
The U.S. refugee screening process capitalizes on a multi-tiered and multi-agency 
approach that partners non-governmental organizations with the federal government.338 
The international mandate of the UNHCR is to protect and assist refugees through a 
lasting solution to their plight. The three possible solutions for refugees are to return to 
their home country, to request asylum in the country they have fled to, or to request 
international resettlement in a third country.339 Under the UNHCR operational 
procedures, most refugees are maintained in temporary housing or camps to await 
repatriation to their country of origin when country conditions improve.340  
After an extended period of time, if the UN determines that repatriation is still 
highly unlikely, they will begin to work with international non-governmental 
organizations to identify refugees who may qualify for firm resettlement in one of many 
different receiving countries. Out of the millions of refugees that UNHCR has registered, 
only about one percent is referred for resettlement to a resettlement country—most 
refugees remain in the country of first asylum to which they fled or eventually return 
home when it is safe to do so.341  
Each receiving country has its own laws and regulations to determine who can 
qualify for refugee status. Although many nations base their refugee laws on the 
international standards set forth by the Geneva Convention, there are nuances that vary 
from one country to the next. There are about out 25 countries worldwide that are willing 
to resettle refugees referred by the UNHCR. The countries that accept the largest number 
of cases are the United States, Canada, Germany, the UK, and the Scandinavian 
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countries.342 Non-governmental refugee processing organizations work to identify and 
prioritize special needs cases (such as women, survivors of torture, unaccompanied 
children, urgent health concerns, etc.).343 The non-governmental organizations work with 
government representatives from multiple countries who conduct interviews with each 
refugee applicant.  
Since 2005, the United States has deployed a specially trained group of refugee 
officers from the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services to determine if overseas applicants qualify for participation in the U.S. Refugee 
Program.344 Refugee officers are trained in immigration law, interviewing techniques, 
and specific country conditions.345 These officers interview the refugee applicants based 
on referrals made by the non-governmental organizations and/or the U.S. Embassy.346 
The refugee applicants who pass the screening and interview process then await the 
clearance of background checks performed by the U.S. government. This waiting period 
can last several months and the case is held in abeyance during the process.347 Any 
refugee who cannot pass the interview or background check process will be denied 
admission under the U.S. Refugee Program. Refugees may request that their cases be 
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reopened or reviewed with new evidence, but there is no formal appeal process.348 The 
entire process is highly selective and controlled. Upon approval, eligible refugees are 
screened again by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officers at a port of entry.349 One 
year after entry, refugees are seen again by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Officers as 
they attempt to adjust their refugee immigration status to that of a Lawful Permanent 
Resident.350     
B. UNLAWFUL ENTRIES, LAWFUL STATUS 
Compare the U.S. Refugee Program to other humanitarian immigration programs 
in which applicants may apply after entering the United States without a prior 
background check or U.S. government screening process. These programs were discussed 
in the fictional scenarios, and include the U.S. Asylum Program, Temporary Protected 
Status, humanitarian parole programs, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, and the 
Cuban Adjustment Act. Within each of these programs, applicants are physically present 
in the United States at time of application. These humanitarian immigration programs do 
not require that the applicants enter the country legally. Applicants can register for the 
program in the United States with some restrictions (depending on the program), and 
await the outcome of the background checks and final decision while present inside the 
United States. Of these programs, only two confer long-term permanent resident status 
and a pathway to U.S. citizenship: the Cuban Adjustment Act and the U.S. Asylum 
Program. If a case is denied, the applicant can still make a case for withholding of 
removal before an immigration judge prior to deportation.351 
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C. UNLAWFUL ENTRIES, UNLAWFULLY PRESENT 
This study must consider the national security implications of a final category of 
immigrant that often remains in the shadows of all legal immigration programs: 
immigrants who enter the United States unlawfully or those who enter the country under 
a temporary visa category and fail to maintain lawful status. Both of these groups are 
unlawfully present in the United States. Of greatest concern to national security are those 
who are virtually unknown to the U.S. government and physically present in the country. 
They have had no background checks or other screening, and may possibly be using a 
false identity in order to reside or work in the country illegally.352   
When considering the importance of background checks and screening, 
immigrants who have entered the country under some type of temporary visa category 
(student, visitor, temporary worker) and do not maintain their status have at least received 
some type of preliminary screening by the Department of State and the Department of 
Homeland Security. Applicants for visitor visas complete paper applications, receive 
electronic background checks, and participate in a brief in-person interview at a U.S. 
Embassy abroad. In-person interviews are required for any visa applicant aged 14–80 
years.353 Information obtained during the application and interview process may be sent 
for verification by U.S. Embassy personnel. Fraud or misrepresentation committed during 
the process can appear at different points, both before and after travel to the United 
States.      
When a person remains beyond his or her period of authorized stay, the 
Department of Homeland Security is notified. The decision to act upon this alert is 
subject to the enforcement priorities and personnel resources available. On November 20, 
2014, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson issued a superseding memo to the 
heads of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
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Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the DHS Office of Policy.354 The 
memo specifically outlines the current immigration enforcement priorities: “Due to 
limited resources, DHS and its components cannot respond to all immigration violations 
or remove all persons illegally in the United States. As is true of virtually every other law 
enforcement agency, DHS must exercise prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of 
the law.”355 The memo goes on to outline more specific priorities for the removal of 
certain undocumented immigrants, such as those with a criminal record, those who are 
concerns to national security, those who are concerns to public safety, and those who 
have repeatedly violated immigration laws.356 In 2015, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement deported 96,045 non-criminal and another 139,368 convicted criminal 
aliens. The total number of people deported from the country in 2015 (235,413) is the 
lowest number deported in over eight years.357  
D. IN HINDSIGHT  
Congressional representatives, political candidates, and the public at large have 
been quick to point the finger at the humanitarian immigration system, particularly the 
U.S. Refugee Program, for putting the nation at increased risk to abuse by terrorists. 
Refugees are screened with far greater rigor than is applied in all other U.S. immigration 
programs, and the screening process occurs while the applicants are still outside of the 
United States. None of the terrorists from the attacks on September 11, 2001 were 
admitted to the United States as refugees; in fact, since September 11th, native-born 
Americans have been responsible for half of the terrorist attacks in the United States.358 
The 10 immigrant terrorists who planned attacks in the United States have the following 
immigration profiles: 
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• 2015 San Bernardino attack = permanent resident based on marriage 
• 2015 killed service members at Tennessee military recruiting office = 
naturalized citizen 
• 2013 Boston bombing = one naturalized citizen and one permanent 
resident, both children of parents granted asylum status in the United 
States 
• 2010 planted bomb in Times Square = naturalized citizen 
• 2010 fired shots at military buildings in Washington, DC = naturalized 
citizen 
• 2009 airplane underwear bomber = visitor visa 
• 2006 drove vehicle through University of North Carolina = naturalized 
citizen 
• 2002 shot employees at Los Angeles El Al ticket counter = permanent 
resident 
• 2001 airplane shoe bomber = visa waiver country, no visa required for 
travel359 
There appears to be a growing number of refugees, as well as U.S. citizens, lured 
via social media and the Internet to fight in support of ISIS. In December 2015, two 
scholars, Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes from the Program on Extremism at the 
George Washington University, published a report titled ISIS in America: From Retweets 
to Raqqa. This report shows 71 individuals have been arrested for ISIS-related activities 
since March of 2014. Two-thirds of the arrests came during 2015. Of the total number 
arrested, 27 percent were also committed to planning attacks on the United States.360 
The American public must remember the reality of what a background check can 
and cannot accomplish. Risk is inherent in any process. Though a background check can 
help to deter unlawful activities and mitigate risk within the immigration system, risk will 
never be eliminated. Background checks will never show every detail of a person’s life, 
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nor a person’s propensity to commit a crime in the future, nor his or her willingness to 
assimilate into the American way of life.  
The one percent of eligible international refugees who are selected to be referred 
to the U.S. Refugee Program are thoroughly reviewed through multiple layers of 
background checks and screening. Protracted refugees who enter the United States legally 
or illegally and are physically present in the United States pose a slightly greater risk as 
they await background checks and a final decision on their humanitarian immigration 
status inside the country. Occasionally, this review process can take years due to large 
backlogs in the U.S. Asylum Program and immigration courts. But a final category of 
unlawful immigrants, and those who circumvent the legal immigration processes of the 
United States, are virtually unknown to the U.S. government. This final population 
should be viewed as the greatest security concern for the nation.  
Immigration enforcement priorities are determined by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. From 2008 to the present, fewer and fewer unlawful immigrants have been 
deported from the country. On the other hand, new refugees are thoroughly vetted and 
scrutinized in detail by multiple federal officers prior to entry into the country. Most 
terrorist attacks in the United States have been committed by naturalized and native-born 
U.S. citizens.  
ISIS seeks to recruit citizens of every nation, including the United States and all 
European countries. Refugees from Syria pose no greater threat to the American public 
than any U.S. citizen who may be susceptible to covert ISIS recruitment. ISIS is actively 
recruiting membership on an unprecedented international scale, with citizens from the 
United States and other countries lured into using irregular travel patterns and fraudulent 
passports in a constant effort to circumvent or abuse global immigration processes. There 
are multiple goals among the Syrian fighters. Of the 71 ISIS sympathizers identified by 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the United States, only 27 percent desired or 
planned to actively attack the United States. Some Americans arrested for their support of 
ISIS claim to have had absolutely no ambition of attacking the United States. 
Understanding the nuances of ISIS and its recruits is necessary to providing appropriate 
security measures. The United States should not allow the threat of any foreign terrorist 
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organization to force the nation to abandon its ideals and identity as an international 
leader willing to accept vulnerable refugees in need. 
 109 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
The federal government’s role in defining immigration and national security in 
the United States dates back to its very founding documents. The Declaration of 
Independence includes a list of “injuries and usurpations” that explains in detail the 
grievances suffered by the American people under the tyrannical rule of the King of 
Great Britain. Chief among them was the following problem: “[The King of Great 
Britain] has endeavoured to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose of 
obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage 
their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of land.”361 The 
authors of the Declaration of Independence recognized that migration was essential to the 
development of the country.  
The U.S. Constitution is the working document that put into action the ideals 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence. According to the U.S. Constitution, to 
provide national security is the only mandatory function of the federal government.362 
There are specific instructions within the U.S. Constitution that relate to the duty of the 
federal government to “suppress insurrections and repel invasions.”363 There is also a 
specific requirement within the U.S. Constitution for the federal government to “establish 
a uniform rule of naturalization.”364 The United States does not differentiate between a 
natural-born and naturalized citizen. The legal definition of naturalization in the United 
States has been set to mean “the act of adopting an alien into a nation, and clothing him 
with all the rights possessed by a natural-born citizen.”365 The United States currently 
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counts 18.7 million naturalized citizens within its population.366 The concepts of 
naturalization and national security have co-existed as central themes from the country’s 
foundation to the present.  
The 2014 Department of Homeland Security Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review emulates the same pro-immigration rhetoric in the strategic priorities of homeland 
security: “Immigration will always be, first and foremost, an opportunity for our country. 
We reap great economic benefits from receiving the best, brightest, and most 
hardworking people from across the globe.”367 The United States cannot close its borders 
or otherwise support anti-immigration policies without altering the nation’s identity.  
The debate on how to allow for legal immigration into the country is also as old as 
the country’s foundation. Alexander Hamilton wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1801:  
There is a wide difference between closing the door altogether and 
throwing it entirely open; between a postponement of fourteen years [at 
this time in history the process of naturalization took fourteen years], and 
an immediate admission to all the rights of citizenship. Some reasonable 
term ought to be allowed to enable aliens to get rid of foreign and acquire 
American attachments; to learn the principles and imbibe the spirit of our 
government; and to admit of a probability at least, of their feeling a real 
interest in our affairs. A residence of not less than five years ought to be 
required.368  
The system of naturalization to produce citizenry in the United States only works when 
new citizens assimilate into the ideals of democracy.369 A study published in 2008 by the 
Manhattan Institute Center for Civic Innovation reviewed data U.S. Census Bureau data 
from 1900 to the present and assigned assimilation indices to different populations. The 
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study determined that immigrants today are assimilating at a slower rate than immigrants 
100 years ago.370 This is an area of important concern.  
The nation’s strategic narrative must be protected and instilled in each new wave 
of immigrants. This does not mean the narrative cannot be modified and improved. In 
fact, dissent is a necessary part of a democracy. The position of the federal government 
and our nation’s strategic narrative can easily be lost in the colorful fray of dissenting 
opinions. We cannot sacrifice our nation’s core values during a political debate. We live 
in a world that is saturated by media. In many ways, the information transmitted through 
the media influences everything from politics to international relations. The government 
must be proactive in the content and format of the nation’s narrative to improve public 
understanding of important issues.371 A bold attempt was made by two military officers, 
U.S. Navy Captain Wayne Porter and U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Mark “Puck” Mykleby, 
to craft a national strategic narrative in 2011. In their document, they wrote:  
As Americans we needn’t seek the world’s friendship or to proselytize the 
virtues of our society. Neither do we seek to bully, intimidate, cajole, or 
persuade others to accept our unique values or to share our national 
objectives. Rather, we will let others draw their own conclusions based 
upon our actions. Our domestic and foreign policies will reflect unity of 
effort, coherency and constancy of purpose. We will pursue our national 
interests and allow others to pursue theirs, never betraying our values.372  
Our actions define us as a nation. In the United States, there exists a sense of 
responsibility for world order. Since World War II, U.S. leadership has actively sought to 
spread democracy and shared values in an international formula for freedom and 
prosperity.373 As Jeh Johnson succinctly states, “In a free and open democratic society, 
we cannot eliminate all risk. Nor should we succumb to panic, fear, and anxiety to 
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compromise our values.”374 In the preface of A National Strategic Narrative, Anne-
Marie Slaughter, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, 
argues that America needs a narrative that citizens can understand and relate to their own 
lives. She goes on to explain that America is not guaranteed a leadership position in the 
world. This is a position that must be earned through respect of the nation’s actions that 
embody universal values.375 Committing our nation’s resources to humanitarian 
immigration, particularly in areas of world with the greatest need, is simply the right 
thing to do for our strategic narrative.   
B. LEGISLATION  
How to modify the existing immigration laws to secure the nation is a constant 
debate. Immigration programs can be adjusted by executive authority directives and 
agency priorities, but real change to immigration law requires an act of legislation. 
Congressional bipartisan support for immigration reform can only be obtained by 
negotiating sections of a bill that would satisfy both ends of the political spectrum. Based 
on the research in this study, the following areas of focus should be considered in future 
comprehensive immigration reform to better address humanitarian immigration 
programs: 
(1) Expand the U.S. refugee definition. 
No country can prevent immigrants from traveling. Refugee populations who 
leave their country of origin for reasons of an urgent or extreme nature represent 
significant challenges to immigration systems. The United States has a legal obligation to 
accept refugees based on its membership in the United Nations and its ratification of the 
Geneva Convention. If a refugee has a valid claim to status under the Geneva Convention 
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and is permitted to seek resettlement through the UNHCR, the United States is prohibited 
from denying the case.  
The U.S. definition of a refugee does not currently include individuals who are 
victims of an environmental catastrophe or victims of a government system that is unable 
to protect its citizens. The U.S. definition of a refugee is specific to those who face 
political persecution due to one of five immutable characteristics: race, religion, ethnicity, 
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. This definition may be 
insufficient.  
Alternative definitions of refugee status as adopted in Latin America (through the 
Cartagena Declaration) and by the Organization of African States include an additional 
provision to aid certain victims of violence.376 The United States rejects these ideas. As a 
result, the United States is seeing an increasing number of protracted refugees who 
lawfully remain in the country in an immigration status that is somewhere between illegal 
and Lawful Permanent Resident. By expanding the U.S. definition of a refugee to include 
those who flee prolonged environmental disasters or periods of violence, the United 
States would enjoy greater flexibility to address humanitarian concerns. 
(2) Keep Temporary Protected Status temporary. 
Temporary Protected Status is a much-needed government program to 
temporarily assist urgent humanitarian immigration needs during natural disasters, 
prolonged violence, or other calamities. Temporary Protected Status is not the means to 
an end. There exists no clear mechanism for ending the status or otherwise allowing those 
with Temporary Protected Status to convert to Lawful Permanent Resident status should 
the need continue for 5, 10, or even 20 years. As stated in the previous section, the U.S. 
definition of a refugee/asylum-seeker should be amended to include a provision for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to designate recipients of Temporary Protected Status as 
eligible for asylum in the United States after a certain period of time. The ability to 
convert Temporary Protected Status into its own permanent immigration category would 
                                                 
376 “The Cartagena Declaration.” See also UNHCR, OAU Convention Governing Refugee Problems in 
Africa. 
 114 
mitigate the need for separate legislation programs to supplement the legal immigration 
system during these types of crises. 
(3) Improve local access to humanitarian immigration programs for families 
in Central America. 
UN statistics prove that the high levels of crime and the lack of law and order in 
Central America are contributing to the massive exodus of Central American migrants, 
particularly minors. Those with valid claims to refugee or asylum status in the United 
States should be able to access U.S. government officials or the UNHCR through an 
office in country. The office currently designated to assist with humanitarian immigration 
needs of Central Americans is located in Costa Rica.377 Humanitarian immigration 
assistance should not require those in need to traverse through unlawful human 
smuggling networks in order to arrive on foot at the southern border of the United States. 
Furthermore, there needs to be a redefined strategy to assist minors and their families in 
urgent need. Current immigration programs (such as the Special Immigrant Juveniles 
Program) unintentionally benefit those children who subject themselves to the danger of 
traveling unaccompanied to the United States, with parents who remain in Central 
America. The new Central American Minors relief program is now available to assist 
minors who remain in Honduras, while their parents travel unlawfully to the United 
States. There is no humanitarian program in place to support united families who seek 
consideration of refugee or asylum status from Honduras.        
(4) Discontinue immigration programs that promote Cuban exceptionalism. 
The United States has officially begun the long process of normalizing relations 
with Cuba. The United States found gradual success in promoting democratic and open 
systems in communist governments such as China and Vietnam. Current immigration 
policies for Cuba continue to promote a system that allows Cuban nationals to 
circumvent the lawful immigration procedures that are required for every other country in 
the world. The Cuban Adjustment Act is contrary to the ultimate goal of establishing fair 
and safe immigration channels for Cuban nationals. Cuban nationals with humanitarian 
                                                 
377 “2015 UNHCR Subregional Operations Profile - Latin America,” UNHCR. 
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needs could continue to use the existing assistance available through the U.S. Refugee 
and U.S. Asylum Programs. The other exceptional program for Cuban nationals, the 
Cuban Medical Parole Program, could be expanded to attract medical doctors from other 
nations.       
(5) Enhance immigration enforcement for those in violation of U.S. 
immigration laws. 
The greatest immigration threats to national security are those who circumvent or 
commit fraud against the existing immigration laws and processes. This population is 
virtually unknown to the U.S. government and consists of those who remain outside the 
law in an effort to do harm or unlawful acts. Immigration enforcement priorities have 
decreased the number of aliens eligible for deportation over the last eight years. The 
United States must send a clear message and follow that message with actions that show 
the nation is serious about enforcing its existing immigration laws.    
(6) Establish greater control over the U.S. Asylum Program. 
The U.S. Asylum Program is used as a last resort for many who seek refuge in the 
United States and are unable to qualify under other programs. There are no numerical 
limitations in the U.S. Asylum Program and anyone can apply for consideration, even 
those who entered the country unlawfully or without proper identification documents. 
The U.S. Asylum Program has a large backlog that results in lengthy processing delays to 
include a review of asylum status by the immigration courts. Unlike refugee applicants, 
those who apply for consideration under the U.S. Asylum Program are eligible to appeal 
a negative determination or otherwise request that the United States not deport the 
individual even if the asylum application is denied. Greater expediency and control over 
this process is necessary for the security of the immigration system. The U.S. Asylum 
Program should try to match its objectives to the recommendations set forth through the 
U.S. Refugee Program and the Department of State. This could be done through 
numerical limitations or determinations made outside the country.    
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C. IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study on humanitarian immigration programs uncovered potential areas for 
future academic research. With millions of naturalized citizens, the United States has 
direct links to every nation in the world. This is potentially a tremendous source of 
strength for the nation. First-generation immigrants could be better utilized by 
government agencies, particularly those that regularly deal with immigration and 
consular processes. Immigrants, and even those who have spent significant time abroad, 
are better able to provide nuanced insight into the languages, ethnicities, security 
concerns, and cultural norms in their countries of origin. This specialized knowledge 
could be developed into country-specific experts used to review applications and engage 
in relevant and country-specific interview questions. The process of engaging country 
background research experts is utilized in the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service’s 
Refugee Corps, but such experts are not regularly utilized in the process of other 
humanitarian immigration programs or immigration enforcement operations conducted 
inside the United States.    
As mentioned in Chapter V, scholars Lorenzo Vidino and Seamus Hughes from 
the George Washington University counted 71 individuals arrested in the United States in 
2014–2015 for their support of ISIS.378 Of the total number arrested, 27 percent were 
committed to planning attacks on the United States. The rest claim to have prepared to 
fight only for an Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The United States should seriously 
consider turning these arrested “enemies” into sources of study. Similar to the tactics 
used by law enforcement to topple vast organized crime and gang networks, low-level 
ISIS sympathizers could provide tremendous insight into the mindset, tactics, and 
recruitment methods used by this global terrorist organization. Additional study could 
focus on the trials and testimony presented by these cases to determine if all ISIS 
sympathizers are a true threat to the security of the United States.  
Now more than ever, border security extends beyond our nation’s physical 
borders. We cannot solve the problem of unlawful immigration by simply building a 
                                                 
378 Vidino and Hughes, ISIS in America. 
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wall. The borders of the country are found at seaports and airports (even some outside the 
United States), as well as the land-based geographical divides and ports of entry. The 
nation must constantly examine how to better improve immigration enforcement 
strategies from within the country, engaging the idea that a nation’s borders can no longer 
be drawn as lines on the ground.  
Finally, the United States is a nation that supports millions of naturalized citizens 
with little distinction between naturalized citizens and those born in the country. Our 
naturalization process is unique. Further study could show whether the naturalization 
process helps or hinders the assimilation of immigrants, particularly new refugees or 
those who hail from non-democratic regimes. There may be elements of the current 
process that could be improved or changed. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The United States is a nation of immigrants. The values represented by 
humanitarian immigration are fundamental to the country’s national identity. The actions 
of U.S. government leaders, particularly on topics involving immigration, send an 
amplified message to the world. The United States cannot afford to abandon its values 
during a crisis. The plight of refugees is a global problem that requires diplomatic 
collaboration. The case studies presented in this research demonstrate the complicated 
migratory experience of all refugees. Those with the greatest need demand consideration 
by all nations able to assist.  
International terrorist organizations prey upon citizens of every nation with 
increasing connectivity. There is a real potential threat to the country from those who 
seek to deceive the government, or circumvent or abuse its legal processes. The unlawful 
leveraging of U.S. immigration benefit procedures is not limited to the U.S. Refugee 
Program. Known cases of fraud must be expeditiously handled through enhanced 
immigration enforcement resources and executive priorities. 
Security is a main focus of all federal government agencies. In a democratic 
system, security is counterbalanced by individual rights and freedoms. The United States 
values its democracy above all else and will never achieve a homeland that is completely 
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void of crime or threats. The risk that accompanies liberty is a risk that all Americans 
should be willing to accept. In the meantime, thousands of American government 
workers dedicate their lives and their careers to ensuring the everyday safety of the public 
by enforcing the available laws and legal procedures. It is because of their service that the 
ideals set forth in the U.S. Constitution and the system of American government continue 
to shine as a last hope for those who flee oppression and violence. 
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